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Crimea is routinely described as “pro-Russian,” given that an estimated 58 percent of
the population of two million is ethnic Russian, with another 24 percent Ukrainian
and 12 percent Crimean Tatar. Many of its inhabitants, regardless of ethnicity, are
actually Russian citizens or dual-passport holders. But the picture is even more
complicated. A vital naval base run by another country, a community of patriotic
military retirees, a multiethnic patchwork, a weak state and competing national
mythologies—that mixture is why a Crimean conflict has long been the nightmare
scenario in the former Soviet Union and now represents the gravest crisis in Europe
since the end of the Cold War.
Professor Charles King1
Crimea had been reunified with the Russian Federation. “We call on everyone to
respect that voluntary choice,” he said, adding that his Government could not refuse
Crimeans their right to self-determination. Historical justice had been vindicated, he
noted, recalling that for many years, Crimea had been part of the Russian Federation,
sharing a common history, culture and people. An arbitrary decision in 1954 had
transferred the region to the Ukrainian Republic, upsetting the natural state of affairs
and cutting Crimea off from Russia.
Summary of comments of Ambassador Anatoly Churkin of the Russian
Federation before the UN General Assembly, March 27, 20142

I.

INTRODUCTION

O

n March 16, 2014 the residents of Crimea woke up in Ukraine, as they
had every morning since the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991.
That evening they went to sleep in what claimed to be the independent
Republic of Crimea. They lived in that putative country for the next day. On
1. Charles King, Ukraine’s Breakaway Region is Becoming a de facto Country, WASHINGTON
POST (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/
09/16/ukraines-breakaway-region-is-becoming-a-de-facto-country/.
2. Press Release, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not To
Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region, U.N. Press Release GA/11493 (Mar. 27,
2014), available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm [hereinafter General Assembly Adopts Resolution].
218

Law, Rhetoric, Strategy

Vol. 91

March 18, the leaders of Crimea signed a treaty merging their day-old
country into Russia.
Much had taken place before these three days in March 2014. There
were arguments about Ukraine associating with the European Union (EU)
or joining a Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. There were warnings
by Russia. Ukraine’s President Victor Yanukovich surprised his fellow
citizens and the European Union when he declared, a few days prior to the
signing ceremony, that Ukraine would not sign the association treaty with
the EU, after all. There were protests in the Maidan, in other areas of Kiev,
and then across most of Ukraine. Troops fired on protesters and people
died. Yanukovich fled or was ousted. Separatists fought for control of
government buildings in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Almost before
anyone realized what was happening, Crimea was held by separatists aided
by “polite men” with military expertise and foreign accents.
And much else has taken place after those three days in March. Unrest
spread across eastern Ukraine. Separatists declared one republic after
another: the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Luhansk People’s Republic,
the Kharkiv People’s Republic, the federal state of Novorossiya.3 These
self-styled new republics had leadership from the old guard of previous
secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet Union.4 Fighting between
separatist militias and the Ukrainian Army grew in ferocity. New weaponry,
including artillery and anti-aircraft missiles, were deployed by the
separatists. A civilian airliner was destroyed, killing all on board. Russian
troops invaded Ukraine and intervened on behalf of the separatists. The
government of Russia denied this. Average Russian soldiers posted on
social media pictures of themselves in Ukraine. Ukraine signed the
association agreement with the EU. Vladimir Putin called for talks to
determine the statehood of eastern Ukraine.5 Negotiations among Ukraine,
3. The People’s Republics of Ukraine, GEOGRAPHIC TRAVELS (June 2, 2014), http://ww
w.geographictravels.com/2014/06/the-peoples-republics-of-ukraine.htmls.
4. Philip Shishkin & Lukas I. Alpert, Pro-Russia Rebels Defiant as Ukraine Military
Advances Toward Donetsk, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 10, 2014), http://online.wsj.com
/articles/ukraine-forces-take-another-rebel-held-town-1404996939; Irena Chalupa, Needing
Better Control in Ukraine War, Moscow Sends in an Old KGB Hand, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (July
17, 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/needing-better-controlin-ukraine-war-moscow-sends-in-an-old-kgb-hand.
5. The Interpreter, a website that translates and analyzes Russian media reports, states
that in an interview on Russian television Putin said:
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Russia, and the EU began. Ukraine and the EU suspended implementation
of part of their association agreement. A ceasefire was announced. The
fighting persists. Negotiations continue.
Some commentators note that Vladimir Putin is an avid chess player;
and, consequently, they liken the events in Ukraine to a game between him
and the West. But the conflict over Crimea and eastern Ukraine is not a
single chess game (or two games, for that matter). It is more accurately
described as multiple simultaneous games with different combinations of
players in which the strategies and outcomes of each game can affect those
of other games. There is one game concerning Russia, Ukraine, and the
European Union: what will be Ukraine’s future relationship with the EU?
There is another game about the status of the ethnic Russian populations
in the former Soviet States (countries that are sometimes called the Russian
“Near Abroad”). Yet another concerning Russia’s standing in relation to
the United States. And, as will be discussed below, there are many other
games taking place as well.
This article will consider one gambit across multiple games: the use of
international legal arguments concerning self-determination in Ukraine. I
have previously addressed similar issues pertaining to international legal
arguments and conflicts in Russia’s Near Abroad.6 Those articles noted a
We must immediately get down to a substantial, substantive negotiations [sic], and not on
technical questions, but on the questions of the political organization of society and statehood
in the south-east of Ukraine with the purpose of unconditional provision of the lawful interests
of people who live there.

Putin Calls for Negotiations for “Statehood” for Southeast Ukraine, THE INTERPRETER (Aug. 31,
2014), http://pressimus.com/Interpreter_Mag/press/4062 (translation by website The
Interpreter).
6. In particular, I discussed the evolution and application of the law of self-determination
as one of the members of the New York City Bar’s mission to Moldova in Special
Committee on European Affairs, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist
Crisis in Moldova, 61 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 196 (2006). I have also written about these issues in Christopher J. Borgen, Public
International Law and the Conflict Over Transnistria, in MANAGING INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS:
LESSONS FROM MOLDOVA AND CYPRUS 83 (Mensur Akgün ed., 2013) and Christopher J.
Borgen, Imagining Sovereignty, Managing Secession: The Legal Geography of Eurasia’s “Frozen
Conflicts,” 9 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 477 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1345846. I consider how great
powers utilize the legal rhetoric of self-determination, particularly in the cases of South
Ossetia and Kosovo in Christopher J. Borgen, Great Powers, Small States, and the Rhetoric of
Self-Determination: The Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
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change over time in Russia’s rhetoric. Crimea, however, represents a
disjuncture with Russia’s previous approach to contested territories in its
Near Abroad. It also may show a shift in why Russia uses the language of
international law as part of its diplomatic strategy.
Part II will review the law of self-determination and examine whether it
is in tension with the territorial integrity of States. Part III will consider
Russia’s rhetorical moves concerning self-determination and territorial
integrity over a series of cases: the separatist crises in Serbia over Kosovo,
in Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in Ukraine over Crimea
and eastern Ukraine. In part, this will be about whether Russia has shifted
its argument away from self-determination, and is re-imagining an old
rhetoric of ethnicity, culture and the righting of historical wrongs. This
section will consider how the language of international law is used as the
rhetoric of diplomacy. Part IV will address how these legal arguments play
a part in the strategies that Russia has over the multiple simultaneous
games in play. It will look at how the rhetoric of international legal
argument is used with different audiences in mind.
These three sections will show the intertwined relationships of
international law, diplomatic rhetoric and politico-military strategy. State
interest will remain the primary determinant of how States act, but each of
these factors—law, rhetoric and strategy—help decide which path a State
will attempt to take towards a particular goal. These three factors affect
each other, sometimes as a constraint and sometimes presenting
opportunities for maneuver.
II. LAW: THE GORDIAN KNOT OF SELF-DETERMINATION,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECESSION
Although the self-determination of peoples is mentioned in the UN
Charter, jurists as recently as the wave of State formation in the mid-1990s
found that “international law as it currently stands does not spell out all the
implications of the right to self-determination.”7 The ambiguity of the
tract_id=1472068. Also, I analyze issues related to great power competition and normative
regionalism in Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, and
Normative Friction, 32 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=989984.
7. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1497 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter Commission, Opinion
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concept was the source of an ongoing debate over the meaning of selfdetermination and its implications for the territorial integrity of States. This
Part will consider the two main interpretations of the relationship of selfdetermination to territorial integrity.
A. The Promise and the Peril of Self-Determination
In a recent panel discussion on self-determination, one leading
international lawyer repeatedly asked why States are so afraid of selfdetermination. Implicit in his query was the sense that self-determination
was a concept imbued with so much hope and promise that it was strange
that it also could be the cause of so much anxiety.
But self-determination has been a source of anxiety for at least a
century. While Woodrow Wilson included in his Fourteen Points that “all
nations had a right to self-determination,” he later said in an address to
Congress: “When I gave utterance to those words, I said them without the
knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after
day.”8
Whether a source of anxiety or not, self-determination has evolved
since Wilson’s day from political rhetoric into a legal right expressed in
treaties and customary international law. The first article of the Charter of
the United Nations states that: “The Purposes of the United Nations are
. . . [t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”9
Moreover, the foundational treaties of the modern human rights
system, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both
No. 2]. The Badinter Commission was organized by what was then the European
Community to sort through the legal issues concerning the status of Yugoslavia and its
possible successor States.
8. MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD
12 (2002). Self-determination could not be squared with several of Wilson’s other goals,
such as ensuring Poland’s access to the sea and the modification of Italy’s frontiers; in
these cases he did not refer to self-determination at all. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY
225 (1994). Kissinger pointed to the willingness to drop the language of self-determination
in these cases as “the first flaws in the moral symmetry of Wilson’s design.” Id.
9. U.N. Charter art. 1. The UN reiterated its commitment to self-determination in
Article 55.
222

Law, Rhetoric, Strategy

Vol. 91

have the same text in their first articles: “All peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”10
In 1970, upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the UN,
the General Assembly passed Resolution 2625, the “Friendly Relations
Declaration,” which reaffirmed the key principles of the UN system,
including:
The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have
the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and
every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter.11

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) further contributed to the
“legalization” of self-determination. In 1975, the Western Sahara Advisory
Opinion affirmed “the validity of the principle of self-determination” under
international law.12 Twenty years later, in the East Timor case, the ICJ not
only reiterated that self-determination is “one of the essential principles of
contemporary international law,” but also held that it is an erga omnes
obligation.13
Two questions remain unresolved. First: what, precisely, is a “people”?
How do we know who or what holds this right of self-determination? And,
second: what does a right of self-determination actually bring? For many,
this second question can be restated as a fear: “does self-determination
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, ¶ 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
11. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
12. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31–33 (Oct. 16). See also Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21).
13. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30). See also JOHN DUGARD,
THE SECESSION OF STATES AND THEIR RECOGNITION IN THE WAKE OF KOSOVO 28
(2013).
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mean that a ‘people’ can dismember a ‘State’?” “Are ‘self-determination’
and ‘secession’ synonyms?”
While the UN Charter and subsequent international law developed a
right of self-determination, territorial integrity is a cornerstone of the UN
system and of modern international law.14 How do self-determination and
territorial integrity interact?15
For Russia, that fear has a name: “Kosovo.” In 2008, Vladimir Putin
said that the States supporting Kosovo’s declaration of independence
“have not thought through the results of what they are doing. At the end
of the day it is a two-ended stick and the second end will come back and
hit them in the face.”16
That second end of the stick was South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But,
before returning to the ins-and-outs of Russia’s arguments, let us first turn
to the consensus interpretation and the leading minority view of the law of
self-determination.
B. The Consensus Interpretation: No Right to Secession
The debate over self-determination is essentially an argument over
language: what does “self-determination” mean and how does it relate to
other concepts, such as “secession”? This becomes essentially two
14. The territorial integrity of States is ensured in UN Charter Article 2(4) which
states in part:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act
in accordance with the following Principles.
....
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

15. As Thomas Franck put it, uti possidetis and self-determination are both
specific products of another time and place, yet both are used frequently and freely in the
debate about the most important political legal issue of our time: what should be the
attitude of the international community towards a post-modern neo-tribal population
inhabiting part of a recognized state which seeks to break away either to form a separate,
new state or to join another state?

THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 146 (1995).
I will discuss the uti possidetis aspect of territorial integrity infra Part III.C.
16. Kosovo Independence Terrible Precedent: Putin, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Feb. 23, 2008),
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/02/23/46011.html.
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questions: who or what has a right of self-determination (“what is a
‘people’?”) and what remedies can one claim if that right is denied?
1. What is a “People”?
As the Canadian Supreme Court put it in Secession of Quebec, its advisory
opinion concerning self-determination, the meaning of “peoples” is
“somewhat uncertain.”17 At various points in international legal history, the
term “people” has been used to signify citizens of a nation-State, the
inhabitants in a specific territory being decolonized by a foreign power or
an ethnic group.18
Equating the term “people” with “nation” has been criticized by some
for being too restrictive, as it is difficult to show that a group is the near
totality of an ethnic nation. But defining “people” based on ethnicity could
be destabilizing to multi-ethnic States. During decolonization, many States
denied that there was a right of self-determination to ethnic groups within
colonial territories.19 According to Antonio Cassese, the “UN has remained
silent in response to claims” by ethnic groups such as the Kurds or the
Basques seeking self-determination.20
In the post-colonial era, instead of returning to the older ethnographic
definition, various commentators have attempted to reframe the analysis by
defining the idea of “the self-determination of peoples” in nonethnographic terms. Professor James Crawford of Cambridge argues that

17. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 123 (Can.) [hereinafter
Canadian Supreme Court Advisory Opinion].
18. See, e.g., PATRICIA CARLEY, SELF-DETERMINATION: SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY, AND THE RIGHT TO SECESSION: REPORT FROM A ROUNDTABLE HELD IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S POLICY PLANNING STAFF 4
(1996), available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pwks7.pdf (noting Professor
Hurst Hannum’s argument that the idea of self-determination during the era of
decolonization was not that all peoples had a right to self–determination but rather that all
colonies had a right to be independent). But see ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION
OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 51 (1995) (stating that by the time the selfdetermination language of Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights was adopted in 1955, few States argued that the principle only applied to colonial
rule).
19. See CASSESE, supra note 18, at 73.
20. Id. at 103.
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the “units” to which the principle of self-determination applies can be best
understood by not focusing on the term “people.” Rather,
[t]he units to which the principle applies are in general those territories
established and recognized as separate political units; in particular it
applies to the following:
(a) trust and mandated territories, and territories treated as non-selfgoverning under Chapter XI of the [UN] Charter;
(b) States, excluding for the purposes of the self-determination rule those
parts of States which are themselves self-determination units as defined;
(c) other territories forming distinct political-geographical areas, whose
inhabitants are arbitrarily excluded from any share in the government
either of the region or of the State to which they belong, with the result
that the territory becomes in effect, with respect to the remainder of the
State, non-self-governing; and
(d) any other territories or situations to which self-determination is
applied by the parties as an appropriate solution.21

In this analysis, category (a) essentially refers to former colonies and, as
such, is not of interest regarding Crimea or eastern Ukraine. Category (b)
concerns how the total citizenry of a State is itself a self-determination unit.
Category (d) would apply only if the parties involved (for example,
Ukraine and the Crimean separatists) agreed that the group in question (the
population of Crimea) was a separate self-determination unit. The problem
here, of course, is that the parties have not agreed upon this issue. While
Crimea did have autonomy within Ukraine, it is not at all clear that the
Ukrainian government viewed the population as a separate selfdetermination unit from the total population of Ukraine. To the contrary
the Crimean Constitution states in Article 1: “The Autonomous Republic
of Crimea shall be an integral part of Ukraine and it shall solve, within the
powers conferred upon it by the Constitution of Ukraine, any and all

21. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (2d
ed. 2006).
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matters coming within its terms of reference.”22 Moreover, Article 73 of
the Ukrainian Constitution requires any referendum concerning territorial
change to be a referendum of all the citizens of the country,23 casting doubt
on the idea that the population of Crimea is (in the view of the Ukrainian
government) a separate self-determination unit, thus making category (d)
inapplicable.
The remaining option would be whether Crimea is a self-determination
unit as described in category (c): “territory becomes in effect, with respect
to the remainder of the State, non-self-governing.” This is usually discussed
regarding areas in which the inhabitants have no say in how they may
govern their own lives. The citizens of Crimea, by contrast, had autonomy:
their own constitution, particularized local laws that they enacted via a
Crimean Parliament and enforced through a locally elected executive.
While the total citizenry of Ukraine is a self-determination unit, it is
difficult to make the argument that inhabitants just of Crimea or of eastern
Ukraine constitute separate self-determination units under international
law.
2. Is Self-Determination a Right to Secession?
While the definition of “self-determination” is contested, “secession” is a
term that is relatively clear: “Secession is the creation of a new independent
entity through the separation of part of the territory and population of an
existing State, without the consent of the latter.”24
The consensus view is that there is no right to secession under
international law. “Secession,” legally speaking, is not a synonym for “selfdetermination.” The drafting committee for the UN Charter noted that
“the principle [of self-determination] conformed to the purposes of the
22. КОНСТИТУЦІЯ АВТОНОМНОЇ РЕСПУБЛІКИ КРИМ KONSTYTUTSIYA
NOYI RESPUBLIKY KRYM [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 12, 1999, art. 1 (Autonomous

AVTONOMRepublic of

Crimea) [hereinafter Constitution of Autonomous Republic of Crimea].
23. KONSTYTUTSIYA UKRAYINY [CONSTITUTION] June 28, 1996, art. 73 (Ukr.)
[hereinafter Constitution of Ukraine].
24. Marcelo Kohen, Introduction to SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES
3 (Marcelo Kohen ed., 2006). See also DUGARD, supra note 13, at 20. There have been
debates over the application of the term “secession,” most notably over the question as to
whether it should apply to the formation of new States after the dissolution of a preexisting State. The question of how to describe the process of dissolution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an example of such a debate.
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UN Charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of
peoples and not the right of secession.”25 Interpreting secession as a
remedy that can be invoked as an operation of law would have clashed
with the territorial integrity of States.
The Québec Commission, a group of experts convened by a committee
of the National Assembly of Québec to provide advice concerning the legal
issues implicated by a hypothetical secession of Québec, considered this
question. The Commission found that the right to self-determination is
context-dependent, that different definitions of “peoples” lead to different
applications of the right to self-determination and that secession is only
recognized as a remedy in the case of decolonization.26 In cases other than
decolonization, there is no right to such “remedial” secession.27
As long as a State allows a minority group the right to speak its
language, practice its culture in a meaningful way and participate effectively
in the political and economic life of its community, then that group is said
to have internal self-determination. If the requirements for internal selfdetermination are not met, then the remedies would be through the
processes of human rights law: judicialized dispute resolution, adjustments
made to local laws and regulations, multilateral monitoring and sanctioning,
and so on. Rather than turning self-determination issues into high-level
political crises involving the dismemberment of States, the consensus view
breaks self-determination down into questions and issues that should be
able to be addressed via the human rights system.
However, two results of this interpretation bear emphasis. First, simply
because it is hoped that a self-determination conflict should be able to be
reframed and solved via human rights mechanisms does not mean that it
actually can or will be. And, second, while there is no right to secession
25. 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 296 (1945), as quoted in CASSESE, supra note 18, at 40. See also CASSESE,
id. at 42 (stating that self-determination does not mean a right to secede).
26. Thomas M. Franck, Rosalyn Higgins, Alain Pellet, Malcolm N. Shaw & Christian
Tomuschat, The Territorial Integrity of Québec in the Event of the Attainment of Sovereignty, in
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED 241,
¶ 3.07 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000).
27. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 247; id. at 248, 279–80 (stating that secession
is only recognized as a remedy in the case of decolonization); CASSESE, supra note 18, at 40
(stating that self-determination does not mean a right to secede). But see MALCOLM N.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 n.140 (5th ed. 2003) (stating that a posited right of
remedial secession is “the subject of much debate”).
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under the consensus view, secession is not illegal, either.28 If anything,
international law is largely silent regarding secession, and attempted
secessions are, first and foremost, assessed under domestic law.29 A
separatist group may secede and in doing so it does not contravene
international law by the simple act of secession. Secession is neither a right
under, nor a breach of, international law. International law treats secession
as a fact. As a matter of modern diplomatic practice, though, secession is
strongly disfavored.
C. The Leading Minority View: Remedial Secession in Extreme Circumstances
This consensus view may be the majority interpretation, but it is not the
only one. Some would ask: “What about the cases where human rights
mechanisms are inadequate, or where the people in question truly want
their own State, not just a basket of rights in someone else’s country?” The
1970 Friendly Relations Declaration is perhaps the most-cited source for
evidence of an emergent rule of customary international law granting a
right of remedial secession. Besides its general statement in support of the
right of self-determination noted above in Part II.A, the Declaration also
contains the so-called “Safeguard Clause”:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
28. A 1996 U.S. Institute of Peace/U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff
Roundtable stated that:
The United States should . . . make absolutely clear that secession has not been universally
recognized as an international right. It may choose, on the basis of other interests, to
support the secessionist claims of a self-determination movement, but not because the
group is exercising its right to secession, since no such right exists in international law. At
the same time, an absolute rejection of secession in every case is unsound, because the
United States should not be willing to tolerate another state’s repression or genocide in
the name of territorial integrity. Secession can be a legitimate aim of some selfdetermination movements, particularly in response to gross and systematic violations of
human rights and when the entity is potentially politically and economically viable.

CARLEY, supra note 18, at vii.
29. Concerning the silence of international law, see, e.g., NGUYEN QUOC DINH,
PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 526, ¶ 344 no. 1
(2002) (“la sécession n’est pas prise en compte en elle-même par le droit international,”
that is, “secession in itself is not taken into account by international law”).
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independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.30

This wording was reiterated in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on
25 June 1993.31
This concept was considered in re Secession of Quebec, the advisory
opinion issued by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Canadian court
found that “[a] right to external self-determination (which in this case
potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession)
arises only in the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully
defined circumstances . . . .”32
More recently, in the wake of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, some
commentators have claimed that the ICJ’s opinion recognized the existence
of remedial secession by not finding Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence to be illegal. I will consider this, and similar arguments, next.
D. Why a General Right to Remedial Secession Does Not (Currently) Exist
The consensus view and the “extreme circumstances” argument that I
describe above are generalizations aggregating a range of views held by
different States around the world. Some of the differences in perspective
and interpretation can be mapped geographically.
Stanislav Chernichenko and Vladimir Kotliar describe three
conferences that took place in 2000–2001, convening lawyers from the

30. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 11; James Crawford wrote that: “At least it is
arguable that, in extreme cases of oppression, international law allows remedial secession
to discrete peoples within a State, and that the ‘safeguard clauses’ in the Friendly Relations
Declaration and the Vienna Declaration recognize this, even if indirectly.” CRAWFORD,
supra note 21, at 119.
31. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July
12, 1993), available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx.
32. Canadian Supreme Court Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 123.
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United States, Europe, Russia.33 In general, Chernichenko and Kotliar
found that self-determination and secession were treated as two separate
concepts by Western lawyers, although there were gradations of views.34
They described the summary document of the U.S. conference as “rather
firmly stat[ing] that the maintenance of a people’s identity does not
necessarily require secession but may be achieved through other means of
internal self-determination such as devolution of power, administrative and
cultural autonomy, creation of local government, etc.”35 However,
European lawyers contended there is a “presumption in contemporary
international law against secession and against recognition of new States”
established in a contested secession.36
By contrast to these Western views, Russian lawyers framed secession
as the ultimate expression of self-determination.37 Theoretically, then,
Russian international lawyers would be the most amenable to the “extreme
circumstances” view. As will be described below, though, the manner in
which they interpret the extreme circumstances necessary to give rise to
remedial secession has been so severe (well, “extreme”) as to make the
possibility of remedial secession a very narrow case.
Taken together, these views show that while there are international
lawyers who argue in favor of interpreting self-determination to include a
right to secession, such a framework does not as of yet exist as positive
international law.38
Consider the counter-factual: if there was a right to remedial secession
outside of the colonial context, then it would have to have been created
either by treaty or by customary international law. Yet no such treaty exists.
33. Stanislav V. Chernichenko & Vladimir S. Kotliar, Ongoing Global Legal Debate on
Self-Determination and Secession: Main Trends, in SECESSION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONFLICT AND AVOIDANCE – REGIONAL APPRAISALS 76 (Julie Dahlitz ed., 2003).
34. Id. at 83.
35. Id. at 82.
36. Id. at 83. See also FRANCK, FAIRNESS, supra note 15, at 151–52 (noting a preference
of the international community for territorial integrity over self-determination leading to
separation).
37. Chernichenko & Kotliar, supra note 33, at 83. For a discussion of the concept of
comparative international law, see Boris N. Mamlyuk & Ugo Mattei, Comparative
International Law, 36 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (2011).
38. For another discussion of this topic, see Katherine Del Mar, The Myth of Remedial
Secession, in STATEHOOD AND SELF DETERMINATION: RECONCILING TRADITION AND
MODERNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (Duncan French ed., 2013).
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What of a customary right to remedial secession? For that to be the case
there would need to be State practice based on a sense of legal obligation.
State practice does not support a customary right of secession. Time
and again we find great powers and small States speaking of the
importance of territorial integrity as a cornerstone of the international
system. Of course, secessions happen, but the rules of the State system
(including rules of recognition, international organization membership and
so on) are stacked against aspirant States that come into being by seceding.
That does not make secession illegal under international law, just politically
disfavored by the members of the international system. Secession is
probably less politically disfavored in some situations, but that does not
mean it has become generally accepted as a right.
Even where we do see new States coming into being, such as in the
former Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, almost no State said these new
countries came into existence by operation of a right to remedial secession. (To
the contrary, the Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission
(Badinter Commission) took pains not to say that and disfavored the
arguments of entities that tried to claim such a right.)
Considering secessionist conflicts since the end of World War II, there
are (depending on one’s criteria) perhaps between one and three examples
of secessions contested by the pre-existing States that were both successful “on
the ground” and were also accepted and recognized by a significant portion
of the international community: Bangladesh, and possibly Kosovo and
South Sudan.39 By contrast, in that period there have been at least twenty (as
39. But see CRAWFORD supra note 21, at 415 (stating that only Bangladesh was a
successful secession). Crawford disqualifies Eritrea because the Transitional Government
of Ethiopia supported Eritrean independence after a plebiscite. Others view this as a
successful secession because the overthrow of the previous Ethiopian government and the
installation of the Transitional Government can be viewed as part of the overall conflict.
Instances of secession outside of the colonial context since the Second World War
include: Senegal (1960); Singapore (1965); Bangladesh (1971); Latvia, Lithuania and
Estonia (1991); the eleven successor States of the USSR (1991); the five successor States
of Yugoslavia (1990s); the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993); and Eritrea (1993).
Crawford did not include Kosovo (as the Kosovar declaration had not yet occurred).
However, Crawford notes that in the cases of Senegal, Singapore, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, each was separated pursuant to separation agreements or operations of their
domestic constitutions. Moreover, the USSR capitulated on the secession of the Baltic
States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) and as of September 6, 1991 no longer contested
their departure. The successor States of the USSR and those of Yugoslavia were formed
due to dissolution of the pre-existing States, not secession. Id. at 392–402.
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yet) attempted secessions that have not been accepted by the international
community.40
In sum, there is very little, if any, State practice to support remedial
secession outside of the colonial context.
Nor are there clear statements of opinio juris, even regarding cases of
oppression. The Safeguard Clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration is
not good evidence of opinio juris. Since the Declaration, States, in their
official pronouncements have backed away from the remedial secession
language as a matter of right. If opinio juris supporting a right to remedial
secession existed, then the ICJ would not have written the following in the
Kosovo Advisory Opinion:
Whether, outside the context of non-self-governing territories and
peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, the
international law of self-determination confers upon part of the
population of an existing State a right to separate from that State is,
however, a subject on which radically different views were expressed by
those taking part in the proceedings and expressing a position on the
question. Similar differences existed regarding whether international law
provides for a right of “remedial secession” and, if so, in what
circumstances. There was also a sharp difference of views as to whether
the circumstances which some participants maintained would give rise to
a right of “remedial secession” were actually present in Kosovo.41

I list Kosovo only as a “maybe” because although 110 UN member States recognize
it, it is not a member of the UN. (Although in comparison to other examples it is very
successful in having secured recognition from most of the key States in its region, as well
as the United States and others.) South Sudan is also listed as a “maybe” since South
Sudan’s separation was based on operation of the provisions of a peace agreement.
40. Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan); Republika Srpska (Bosnia-Herzegovina); The
Karen and Shan States (Burma); Tibet (China); Katanga (Congo); Turkish Federal
Republic of Northern Cyprus (Cyprus); Abkhazia (Georgia); South Ossetia (Georgia); East
Punjab (India); Kashmir (India); Kurdistan (Iraq/Turkey); Anjouan (Islamic Republic of
the Comoros); Gagauzia (Moldova); Transnistria (Moldova); Biafra (Nigeria); Bougainville
(Papua New Guinea); Chechnya (Russian Federation); Somaliland (Somalia); Tamil Elam
(Sri Lanka); and Democratic Republic of Yemen (Yemen). This original version of this list
is from CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 403; I have made some changes due to subsequent
history and my own analysis of the situations.
41. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 82 (July 22) [hereinafter
Kosovo Advisory Opinion].
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Based on this, there is neither adequate State practice nor opinio juris to
claim a right of remedial secession under customary international law.
Within this context of law as it is at this time, how we should understand
Russian arguments concerning self-determination and secession?
III. RHETORIC: THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN ARGUMENTS FROM
KOSOVO TO CRIMEA, FROM TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY TO
TERRITORIAL IRREDENTISM
A. Overview
For President Putin, the situation in Crimea has its roots in Kosovo.
Kremlin watchers have argued that the loss of Kosovo was a traumatic
experience for President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In his
speech of March 18 declaring that Crimea was “reuniting” with Russia,
President Putin revisited the disagreements over Kosovo’s declaration of
independence:
I do not like to resort to quotes, but in this case, I cannot help it. Here is
a quote from . . . [an] official document: the Written Statement of the
United States America of April 17, 2009, submitted to the same UN
International Court in connection with the hearings on Kosovo. Again, I
quote: “Declarations of independence may, and often do, violate
domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of
international law.” End of quote. They wrote this, disseminated it all over
the world, had everyone agree and now they are outraged. Over what?
The actions of Crimean people completely fit in with these instructions,
as it were. For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we have
full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians, Ukrainians and
Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed. Again, one wonders why.42

Putin was not the only one to echo the Kosovo debate. In what was
likely a reference to the arguments by the United States, the United
Kingdom and others that Kosovo’s situation was a “special case,”43
42. Vladimir Putin, President, Russian Federation, Address Before the State Duma
deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society
representatives in the Kremlin (Mar. 18, 2014) (transcript available at http://eng.krem
lin.ru/transcripts/6889) [hereinafter Putin, Crimea Address].
43. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained:
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview in September
2014, he believes “that Crimea was a very special case, a unique case from
all points of view. Historically, geopolitically, and patriotically, if you
wish.”44
Such rhetorical mirroring could be intended to make it difficult for the
United States to condemn Russian actions, understanding that the legal fine
points of distinguishing the cases of Kosovo and Crimea would be lost in
the rough sport of political argument. It could also be an example of a titfor-tat diplomatic strategy, in which Russia is signaling to the United States
that interpretive moves made by the United States will be used by Russia as
well, thus incentivizing constrained interpretations by the United States.45
In any case, Russia’s shift in rhetoric can be legally significant as it builds
State practice for particular interpretations of the concepts of selfdetermination and secession.
As Nico Krisch has explained, in some cases “powerful states tend to
use international law as a means of regulation as well as of pacification and
stabilization of their dominance”; in others, “faced with the hurdles of
equality and stability that international law erects, they withdraw from it.” 46
Dominant States do not usually maintain static approaches to international
law, but rather “oscillate” between instrumentalization and withdrawal.47
For Russia, that oscillation is couched as an evolving understanding of
international law. While Russia may be oscillating away from the consensus

The unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation—including the
context of Yugoslavia’s breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against
civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of UN administration—are not found
elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as precedent
for any other situation in the world today.

Press Release, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as
Independent State (Feb. 18, 2008), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm
/2008/02/100973.htm..
44. Interview with Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister (Sept. 11, 2014)
(transcript available at Sergey Lavrov: Throwing Russia Off Balance is Ultimate Aim, ITAR-TASS
(Sept. 11, 2014.), http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/748935) [hereinafter Lavrov Interview].
45. Regarding “tit-for-tat” as a diplomatic strategy, see generally ROBERT AXELROD,
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
46. Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of
the International Legal Order, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 369, 371
(2005).
47. Id. at 379.
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view of international law, rather than withdrawal from legal rhetoric, it is
constructing its own “legal” framework.
This Part will chart how Russia’s interpretation of self-determination
has changed over the last decade. In Part IV, I will consider the strategic
uses of Russia’s changing arguments.
B. Russia’s Rhetoric of Self-Determination: Ad Hoc Justifications or Evolving Theory?
In assessing Russia’s shifting arguments concerning self-determination and
territorial integrity, a fundamental question is whether arguments deployed
regarding Kosovo, South Ossetia and Crimea are different due to an
evolving theory of self-determination or are simply tactical justifications to
fit the situation.
Before assuming one or the other answer too quickly, one needs to
keep in mind what has been relatively consistent in Russia’s statements
concerning self-determination. Although Russia has tried to maintain room
for its own maneuver by exploiting the ambiguous nature of selfdetermination, up through the debate over Kosovo status it has primarily
used a rhetoric based on territorial integrity and sovereignty. This led to
critiques of hypocrisy in the cases of Russia’s support for separatists in
Transnistria (Moldova), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and pre-Kosovo
independence South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia). However, prior to
Kosovo’s independence, despite the significant political, military, economic
and logistical support it supplied to these separatists, Russia paid lip-service
to the sovereignty of the pre-existing States and did not formally recognize
any of the separatist regimes. After Kosovo, Russia altered how it
described the legal issues concerning these situations and its diplomatic
approach shifted as well.
This section will consider this period of change though the optic of
Russian official statements in public fora such as speeches by the Russian
President and Foreign Minister, statements made before the United
Nations General Assembly and Security Council, and positions taken in
proceedings before the ICJ. Such statements are attempts to frame
justifications for various audiences, including the Russian public, the
publics and political elites of the Russian Near Abroad, the United States,
EU member States and key partners such as China. The use of legal
language can also deter other States who are not directly involved from
intervening.
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I will also consider analyses by notable Russian legal academics,
particularly those that are addressing a broader audience, such as the
professional community of international lawyers around the world. Tarja
Långström has argued that “scholarship of international law is still closely
intertwined with the state” and that “‘official political thinking’ plays a far
more dominant role in Russian international law scholarship, than, say, in
the United States where academic lawyers perceive their role more as critics
of government than its advocates.”48 In the post-Stalin years, when the
inevitability of war with capitalist States was no longer an ideological given,
Soviet international law scholars could assume there was a single
international legal system for all States.49 Their arguments often turned on
showing how the West violated the norms of that system. In the era of
perestroika, the State-centric view began to be set aside for a new
cosmopolitan humanism.50 However, the Western-oriented policies that
were adopted soon after the end of the USSR were then overtaken by a
new assertiveness of Russian prerogatives and Russian conceptions of
legality.51 Anton Moiseienko wrote in September 2014 that “so far Russian
academics and practitioners have largely remained in the shade, at least on
the international arena, while Russian State officials felt free to interpret
international law up to the point of redesigning it.”52
In order to assess Russia’s arguments, I will first turn to how Russia
has answered (if at all) the questions of “what is a people?” and “does selfdetermination entail a right to secession?” in the cases of Kosovo and/or
South Ossetia, and then move forward to current statements regarding
Crimea. I will also consider two other related issues that have figured
prominently in Russia’s rhetoric: the role of referenda and the norms of
recognition of new States. Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence,
Russia has further de-emphasized sovereignty and territorial integrity in
talking about the countries of its Near Abroad. In Part C, which follows, I

48. TARJA LÅNGSTRÖM, TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
169 (2003).
49. Id. at 167.
50. Id. at 108.
51. Id. at 120.
52. Anton Moiseienko, Guest Post: What do Russian Lawyers Say about Crimea?, OPINIO
JURIS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/24/guest-post-russian-lawyers-saycrimea/. I am a co-founder and editor of Opinio Juris.
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will discuss how Russia has started a new argument based on what it
perceives as righting historical injustices.
1. Are the Populations of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine Self-Determination
Units?
In its written submission to the ICJ during the proceedings concerning the
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Russia provided a definition of people emphasizing
that “[i]t is widely accepted that a population of a trust or mandated
territory, of a non-self-governing territory, or an existing State, taken as a
whole, undisputedly qualifies as a people entitled to self-determination.”53
Without clearly defining what meaning “non-self-governing territory”
would have outside of the colonial context, the point of emphasis was that
the population of a State “taken as a whole” is clearly a self-determination
unit. This statement was immediately followed by: “Whether, and under
which conditions an ethnic or other group within an existing State may
qualify as a people, is subject to extensive debates.”54 This undercuts claims
by sub-national groups that they are self-determination units.
In the oral proceedings Russia continued with this interpretation: “the
words ‘the will of the people’ do not necessarily refer to the population of
Kosovo only and could very well encompass the whole population of the
country concerned, or else reflect the general notion of ‘popular will’ as a
principle of democracy.”55
Considering Russia’s interpretation of the term “will of the people” in
later years, it is interesting to note that here Russia argued that the term
should refer to the will of all the citizens of Serbia (including Kosovo), not
just those located in Kosovo.
Russia’s explanation in the oral proceedings also argued that whether
or not a group is a “people” cannot be based on the fact of administrative
autonomy within an existing State. The group claiming to be a selfdetermination unit needs to be a people based on its own characteristics, as
opposed to the administrative structure of the pre-existing State:

53. Written Statement of the Russian Federation, Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra
note 41, ¶ 81 (Apr. 16, 2009).
54. Id.
55. Oral Statement by Russian Federation, Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 41,
¶ 16 (Dec. 8, 2009).
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[T]he authors of the UDI and their supporters have spent considerable
efforts to show that the population of Kosovo should be regarded as a
people for the purposes of self-determination due to the particularities of
the federal structure of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The
main points have been made about the scope of competences of Kosovo
and the fact that it was directly represented at the federal level. But that is
hardly relevant. What matters is the legal qualification of a given
population as of a people. And that is something that is obviously lacking
from the successive Constitutions of Socialist Yugoslavia.56

In sum, according to Russia, “[t]he population of Kosovo has never been
recognized as a self-determination unit.”57
Regarding Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the Russian Federation
government and legal elites closely tied with the government have simply
stated that the population of Crimea is a “people,” without any further
explanation. Anatoly Kapustin, the President of the Russian Association of
International Law wrote in a June 2014 open letter to the members of the
International Law Association that “the leaders of the USA and the EU
opposed in rigid tones the expressed will of [the] Crimea people by means
of a referendum and against realization by [the] Crimea people of the
principle of self-determination of peoples.”58
In his presidential speech on Crimea, Putin underscored not the
uniqueness of the Crimean people, but rather their ties to Russia:
“Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride.”59 He
further emphasized that Crimea is similar to Russia by its multi-ethnicity:
“Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and traditions. This
makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has
been lost over the centuries.”60
Certain Russian international law academics did set out arguments for
the population of Crimea being a self-determination unit. Anton
Moiseienko wrote: “With regard to international law, several participants of
56. Id., ¶ 10.
57. Id., ¶ 24.
58. Letter from Anatoly Kapustin, President of the Russian Association of
International Law, to Executive Council, International Law Association (June 2014),
available at http://www.mgimo.ru/study/faculty/mp/kmp/news/n252984.phtml [hereinafter Kapustin Letter].
59. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42.
60. Id.
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the April 2014 conference grappled with the issue of whether Crimea’s
population is a ‘nation’ for the purposes of the right to self-determination.
In their view, the predominantly Russian population of the peninsula ought
to qualify as a separate ‘nation.’”61 How this would be able to be squared
with Russia’s arguments against, for example, the people of Kosovo being
a self-determination unit remains unclear.
Russian statements instead focus on the “coup” against Ukrainian
President Yanukovich as frustrating the political will of the population of
Crimea. Russian rhetoric also emphasizes that the people or peoples of
Crimea have long historical ties to Russia. Both of these arguments imply
that the population of Crimea is a separate self-determination unit from the
citizens of Ukraine as a whole, but neither explains why that would be the
case.
Kapustin argued in his open letter that the “Russian-speaking
population of the southeastern regions of Ukraine demands the respect for
their rights, traditions, culture and language.”62 While it is one thing to note
that the population of southeastern Ukraine has a language (Russian) and
culture that is different from the majority of Ukrainians, that does not
make them a separate people. If this were true, then every ethnic or
linguistic enclave in the world would be a different self-determination unit.
Such an interpretation would neither conform to State practice in general
nor with Russia’s pointed arguments from the Kosovo proceedings about
what makes a self-determination unit.
The question that needs to be answered is whether the Ukrainian
citizens in eastern Ukraine are actually a separate people, a “selfdetermination unit” distinct from the rest of Ukraine’s citizens. While
Kapustin does not actually set out a rigorous argument in terms of whether
the population of eastern Ukraine is a separate self-determination unit, he
does make some impressionistic sketches of an argument, noting shared
history and culture of eastern Ukraine and Russia, as well as Crimea’s
autonomous status:
Ethnic Russians in Ukraine, particularly in the south-eastern
regions, are not a minority. The territory that has been an
independent state of Ukraine since 1991 previously was a part of the

61. Moiseienko, supra note 52.
62. Kapustin Letter, supra note 58 (boldface in original).
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USSR, and even earlier—for centuries—it was a part of the Russian
Empire. This is a historic evidence [sic].63

Keep in mind that Russia argued in the Kosovo proceedings that
administrative facts, such as a status of autonomy, are irrelevant in
determining whether or not an entity is a self-determination unit.
Kapustin’s argument seems to be less about making a technical claim that
eastern Ukraine is a self-determination unit and more about fashioning a
persuasive rhetoric based on shared history, as if this somehow lessens
Ukraine’s sovereign rights over the territory. The idea of shared culture and
history between all of Ukraine (and especially eastern Ukraine) and Russia
is a theme that has been consistently emphasized in Russian statements.64
What is surprising about this is who made the argument and to whom it
was being made. Kapustin is one of Russia’s most prominent living public
international lawyers. His letter was to other public international lawyers
around the globe. And yet his argument set aside what had been the moreor-less common approach to defining a self-determination unit (let alone
Russia’s approach) and simply painted in broad strokes. It is as if the
Russian leadership realized that it would be on shaky ground if it tried to
build anything like a classic argument based on self-determination; so,
instead, it began a parallel construction based on history and cultural
affinity. As I will explain in Part IV, this is a new form of argument that
may assuage the concerns of certain audiences, particularly China, but may
prove alarming to the leaders of countries in the Russian Near Abroad that
have large ethnic Russian populations.
In any case, the idea of eastern Ukraine as part of Russian history, and
especially how this may relate to its separation from Ukraine, is underlined
by the return of the idea of “Novorossiya,” described in Foreign Policy as the

63. Id. (boldface in original).
64. Id. Concerning Ukraine’s affinity with Russia more generally, he wrote:
Many people in Ukraine speak Russian as a first language and consider Russia a
closely related country rather than a foreign one. Russian-speaking people in Ukraine
are not immigrants. They were born there. This is the land of their parents and
ancestors. Ukraine is their Slavic motherland. Russian culture and history are their
native. There are many family linked people in Russia and Ukraine.

Id. (boldface in original).
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rebirth of a forgotten geopolitical term.65 Anne Applebaum wrote in Slate
magazine on August 29, 2014:
In the past few days, Russian troops bearing the flag of a previously
unknown country, Novorossiya, have marched across the border of
southeastern Ukraine. The Russian Academy of Sciences recently
announced it will publish a history of Novorossiya this autumn,
presumably tracing its origins back to Catherine the Great. Various maps
of Novorossiya are said to be circulating in Moscow. Some include
Kharkov and Dnipropetrovsk, cities that are still hundreds of miles away
from the fighting. Some place Novorossiya along the coast, so that it
connects Russia to Crimea and eventually to Transnistria, the Russianoccupied province of Moldova.66

Applebaum is describing constructing a historical narrative in order to
form a national identity, where perhaps none existed before. Legal rhetoric
of who is or is not a “people” can play a part in constructing an identity.
However, although statements by Russian political leaders and
international lawyers gave a general sense of the populations of Crimea and
eastern Ukraine being different from the rest of Ukraine, they did not
clearly state that either population met the formal criteria of being a selfdetermination unit. The closest that some of the analyses came to this was
in implying that the ouster of Yanukovich frustrated the internal selfdetermination of the population of Crimea (and possibly eastern Ukraine),
as he was politically popular in these parts of the country.67
65. Christian Caryl, Novorossiya is Back from the Dead, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/17/novorossiya-is-back-from-the-dead/.
66. Anne Applebaum, War in Europe, SLATE (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/08/vladimir_putin_s_troops_have_invaded_
ukraine_should_we_prepare_for_war_with.html.
67. Moiseienko described Russian academic international lawyers at an April 2014
conference as arguing that “no internal self-determination was possible for the residents
of Crimea in ‘pro-fascist’ Ukraine.” Moiseienko, supra note 52. The claim that
Yanukovich’s leaving office was the result of an anti-democratic coup relates to another
ongoing theme in Russian arguments concerning the Near Abroad: that the “color
revolutions” of the 2000s were Western-sponsored covert operations meant to encircle
Russia. Lavrov argued that the “color revolutions” were not examples of average citizens
yearning for democracy:
The operations to change regimes in sovereign states and the foreign-orchestrated ‘color
revolutions’ of different brands produce obvious damage to the international stability. The
attempts to impose one’s own designs for internal reforms on other peoples, which don’t

242

Law, Rhetoric, Strategy

Vol. 91

But this places the cart before the horse by assuming these
populations had separate rights of internal self-determination. Perhaps this
argument was meant to be a stand-in for saying that Crimea and eastern
Ukraine were non-self governing territories. But, given that Crimea actually
had autonomous status with its own parliament and local political
leadership, it is difficult to make this claim sound credible.
2. What is the Remedy?
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the populations of Crimea and of
eastern Ukraine are self-determination units, how have Russian lawyers and
political leaders answered the question whether there was a right to
secession?
One leading Russian treatise that addresses self-determination is
International Law—A Russian Introduction, edited by Valeriĭ Kuznetsov and
Bakhtiiar Tuzmukhamedov of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.68 The English edition, with a forward by
Foreign Minister Lavrov, was published in the wake of NATO’s Kosovo
campaign in 1999, but prior to Russia’s 2008 war in Georgia. It emphasized
the importance and broad nature of territorial integrity and inviolability.
Territorial integrity “is the protection of the territory of a State against any
infringement from without.”69 The importance of the protection of a
take into account national characteristics, to ‘export democracy’, impact destructively
international relations and multiplies the number of flashpoints on the world map.

See West’s Expansion to the East Ruins Historic Chance at Unification—Lavrov, RUSSIA TODAY
(May 23, 2014), http://rt.com/news/160940-lavrov-security-west-expansion/. For a
longer analysis of the “color revolutions,” see LINCOLN A. MITCHELL, THE COLOR
REVOLUTIONS (2012).
68. It is actually a collective work, with about nineteen authors. VALERIĬ I.
KUZNETSOV & BAKHTIIAR R. TUZMUKHAMEDOV, INTERNATIONAL LAW—A RUSSIAN
INTRODUCTION xix (William E. Butler ed. & trans., 2009).
69. Id. at 140. In full, the quote reads (emphasis added):
Territorial integrity is the protection of the territory of a State against any infringement from
without; no one should make [an] attempt against the territory of a State for the purposes
of full or partial occupation thereof or penetrate into its land, underground, maritime, or
airspace against the will of the authorities of the particular State.

The authors also explained that Russia’s views of territorial inviolability went beyond
just territorial integrity. While the unsanctioned intrusion of a foreign aircraft may not
violate territorial integrity, it “would be a violation of territorial inviolability.” Id. at 140.
The authors go on to note, that: “[t]he transit, for example, of any means of transport
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State’s territory also plays a part in their analysis of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, noting that “[a]ccording to the 1970 Declaration, the use of
references to self-determination to undermine the unity of a State is
inadmissible.”70 The authors go on to quote the second half of the Savings
Clause and explain that the right of self-determination may lead “to a
disruption of territorial integrity, but only in those States where the
principle of equality and self-determination of peoples is not observed, the
entire people are not represented in agencies of power, and individual
ethno-territorial parts of the State are subject to discrimination.”71
Although this does allow for the possibility of remedial secession, it
sets the bar high. The treatise also struck a note of caution concerning the
use of the rhetoric of self-determination:
One cannot fail to note that in recent years the threat of abusing this
principle has arisen and become a reality. Political, nationalist, separatist,
criminal, and other factors often are becoming the driving force for using
the principle for mercenary purposes. For many States a real threat to
territorial integrity has been created. Therefore, the realization of this
principle should not lead to the destruction of existing States.72

The authors concluded by emphasizing the rights of States as well as
the interests of other peoples geographically close to the people in
question:
[T]he realization by a people of its right to self-determination must be
effectuated only in accordance with the freely-expressed will of the
respective State(s), taking into account the legal rights and interests of
other peoples residing on this or neighboring territories, and also with
due regard to other basic principles of contemporary international law.73

across foreign territory without the authorization of authorities of the particular State is a
violation of the inviolability not only of the boundaries, but also of the territory since it is
being used in transit.” Id. at 142. Russia will take a different view of territorial inviolability
when it begins sending convoys into eastern Ukraine in support of the separatists.
70. Id. at 150.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 150–51.
73. Id. at 151.
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This mode of analysis considers the goals of the people in question in
light of the rights of the pre-existing State and (in a formulation that is not
seen as often) in relation to the rights of other peoples in the region. Such
complex balancing would make claims of a right to secede relatively
difficult to maintain.
In the 1990s Russia was concerned about its own restive nationalities,
Chechnya in particular. The Russian concern with secessionism was
reflected in its domestic jurisprudence. According to James Summers, the
Friendly Relations Declaration was
considered by the First and Second Russian Constitutional Courts in the
Tatarstan (1993) and Chechnya (1995) cases. In Tatarstan, the Russian
Constitutional Court, referring to the Declaration, considered that it
emphasized, “the impermissibility of making reference to the principle of
self-determination in order to jeopardize state and national unity.” In the
Chechnya case the Russian state was assumed to be representative, despite
a violent secessionist struggle that was taking place in Chechnya at the
time. All this supports a relatively restrictive interpretation of the
provision.74

In its written submission to the ICJ in the Kosovo proceedings, Russia
interpreted the Safeguard Clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration in a
similar manner as the treatise, stating that
[T]he Russian Federation is of the view that the primary purpose of the
“safeguard clause” is to serve as a guarantee of territorial integrity of
States. It is also true that the clause may be construed as authorizing
secession under certain conditions. However, those conditions should be
limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack
by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in
question. Otherwise, all efforts should be taken in order to settle the
tension between the parent State and the ethnic community concerned
within the framework of the existing State.75

74. James Summers, Russia and Competing Spheres of Influence: The Case of Georgia,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 109
(Matthew Happold ed., 2012) (citations omitted).
75. Written Statement of the Russian Federation, supra note 53, ¶ 88.
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Once again, Russia minimized recourse to remedial secession, noting that
“the very existence” of the people in question must be at issue.
In 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called Kosovo’s potential
separation from Serbia a “subversion of all the foundations of international
law, . . . [a] subversion of those principles which, at huge effort, and at the
cost of Europe’s pain, sacrifice and bloodletting have been earned and laid
down as a basis of its existence.”76 In Russia’s view, even action by the
Security Council could not legalize secession against the wishes of the preexisting State. This position of the Russian Federation, which it held since
the Kosovo issue arose on the Security Council agenda, was based on
general principles of international law—it was unacceptable for the Security
Council to encourage or authorize any action that would dismember a
sovereign State.77
But, less than a year later, when discussing Russia’s invasion of
Georgia, Foreign Minister Lavrov shifted from an argument based on
territorial integrity to a one based on the protection of co-nationals or coethnics:
We can’t understand why those who are talking about the responsibility
to protect and about security of the person at every turn, forgot it when it
came to the part of the former Soviet space where the authorities began
to kill innocent people, appealing to sovereignty and territorial integrity.
For us, the issue in South Ossetia was to protect our citizens directly on
the borders of Russia, not in the Falkland Islands.78

This idea of protecting Russians, who were once all part of the USSR but
are now separated from Russia by these new 1992 boundaries became a
recurring theme in Russian public diplomacy.
In addition to the protection of ethnic Russians, in his March 18
speech concerning Crimea President Putin also considered his
interpretation of historical wrongs. There was nothing about remedial
secession directly. Rather, he spent the opening sections of his speech
76. Paul Reynolds, Legal Furore over Kosovo Recognition, BBC (Feb. 16, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7244538.stm.
77. Oral Statement by Russian Federation, supra note 56, ¶ 30.
78. Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Policy and a New Quality of the Geopolitical Situation,
DIPLOMATIC YEARBOOK 2008 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation),
available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/bc2150e
49dad6a04c325752e0036e93f?OpenDocument [hereinafter Lavrov, YEARBOOK].
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decrying the historical mistake of Khruschev handing Crimea over to
Ukraine “like a sack of potatoes.”79
While (Serbia’s) sovereignty and territorial integrity were the focus of
Russian diplomacy concerning Kosovo, there was little talk about
protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty. “It is also obvious that there is no
legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to.”80 And
then, as Putin described the situation, “the residents of Crimea and
Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and their
lives.”81 Once again, this is an argument based on the protection of coethnics and on territorial irredentism. Borders and sovereignty can become
rather wispy and insubstantial when you hear the call of people of the same
ethnicity or who speak the same language as you do. Until recently many
were not even Russian citizens, but they had recently become holders of
Russian Federation passports through a process of “passportization” of
ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad.82
3. The Role of Referenda
Perhaps due to the difficulty of building a persuasive argument for Crimea
seceding as a matter of right, either under the consensus interpretation or
under Russia’s previous interpretations of the law of self-determination,
much of the rhetoric of Russian officials has revolved around the
importance of referenda. The process of the referendum becomes a
substitute for the substantive law of self-determination. Vladimir Putin said in
August that: “We did not annex [Crimea], we did not seize it, we gave
people the opportunity to express themselves and make a decision and we
treated that decision with respect.”83 In a September 2014 interview
replying to critics of Russian policy, Foreign Minister Lavrov contrasted
the situation in Crimea to that of Kosovo:
79. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Regarding passportization in Crimea, see Justin A. Evison, Migs and Monks in
Crimea: Russia Flexes Cultural and Military Muscles, Revealing Dire Need for Balance of Uti
Possidetis and Internationally Recognized Self-Determination, 220 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 90,
121 (2014).
83. Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Comments at Seliger 2014 National Youth
Forum (Aug. 29, 2014) (transcript available at http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/22864)
[hereinafter Putin, August Comments].
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Crimea saw a referendum and it could not be staged. A lot of journalists,
including foreign ones, who were doing their job in the peninsula at that
moment acknowledged this. . . .
In response to reproaches from our western partners we tell them that in
Kosovo their policy was quite different. There was no referendum, as
well as there had been no crisis before part of Serbia was declared
independent. There were no threats to Kosovo’s people.84

Russia maintained that one of the key differences between Kosovo and
Crimea was the fact that a referendum was held in the latter in March 2014
(with no mention of issues of procedural flaws). Following suit, the leaders
of the separatist-held areas in eastern Ukraine conducted their own
referendum on May 11, 2014, largely modeled on the Crimean referendum.
They announced a result in favor of unification with Russia. However,
Russia was notably muted in its response, with the Kremlin’s press office
stating, “Moscow respects the will of the people in Donetsk and Luhansk
and hopes that the practical realization of the outcome of the referendums
will be carried out in a civilized manner.”85
Referenda and plebiscites are emblematic of democracy and public
participation. But they can also be used as a mask for territorial expansion.
Wilhelm Grewe noted that Napoleonic France used the language of selfdetermination and the process of referenda “to disguise an unrestrained
policy of expansion.” The 1795 plebiscite in Austrian Netherlands (which
became Belgium) was later called a “bitter comedy.”86
Referenda in separatist enclaves are nothing new. Transnistria has
repeatedly attempted to use plebiscites to claim independence from
84. Lavrov Interview, supra note 44.
85. Moscow in No Rush to Respond to Donetsk People’s Republic Plea for Accession, RUSSIA
TODAY (May 12, 2014), http://rt.com/op-edge/158528-russia-response-ukraine-done
tsk/. The motivation behind the restrained response is a topic of speculation. As will be
discussed below, one possible reason is that forcibly separating these regions from
Ukraine would not serve a useful foreign policy goal, while putting their political future in
play—and thus the subject of ongoing mediation with Ukraine and the EU—would likely
be more effective.
86. WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (Michael Byers
trans., 2000), quoting ROBERT REDSLOB, HISTOIRE DES GRANDS PRINCIPLES DU DROIT
DES GENS 320 (1923).
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Moldova and possible unification with Russia.87 They have received no
support from the international community (and, as of this writing, Russia
has not endorsed Transnistria’s unification with the Russian Federation).
South Ossetia and Abkhazia also used referenda in their bids for
independence; Russia did reference those referenda in its statement
recognizing each as new States.88
International law does not confer any special status on referenda and,
as a matter of practice, the international community has not given much
weight to referenda that do not have the backing of the pre-existing State.
Back in the interwar period, the Aaland Islands attempted to use a
referendum to secede from Finland. The International Commission of
Jurists that assessed the situation for the League of Nations found that
there was no right of national groups to separate by the simple expression
of a wish.89
Of particular relevance to Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the ability to
choose secession by plebiscite must be granted by the State itself, in this
case, Ukraine.90 The role of referenda is not a question of international law,
but of domestic law. Assuming there is no right of remedial secession, it is
only the Ukrainian Constitution that could confer a right to Crimea to
leave by referendum. Title X of the Ukrainian Constitution concerns the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea; there is no mention of secession by act
of regional parliament or by local referendum. Moreover, Article 73 of the
Ukrainian Constitution requires any referendum concerning territorial
87. I discuss the 2006 Transnistrian referendum in Chris Borgen, Secession by
Referendum?, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2006), http://opiniojuris.org/2006/09/17/secessionby-referendum/.
88. President Medvedev said: “Considering the freely expressed will of the Ossetian
and Abkhaz peoples and being guided by the provisions of the UN Charter, the 1970
Declaration on the Principles of International Law Governing Friendly Relations Between
States, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other fundamental international
instruments . . . .” Statement, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev (Aug. 26, 2008),
available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_2
05752.shtml.
89. See the Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council
of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal
Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Off. J. Spec. Supp. No. 3, at
5–10 (1920).
90. To take two examples from the European Union, consider the different
receptions of the referendum in Scotland, which was sanctioned by London, and the
referendum concerning Catalonia, which was not viewed as legal by Madrid.
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change to be a referendum of all the citizens of the country.91 Even the
Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea defers to the
Ukrainian Constitution. Article 1 of the Crimean Constitution states: “The
Autonomous Republic of Crimea shall be an integral part of Ukraine and it
shall solve, within the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution of
Ukraine, any and all matters coming within its terms of reference.”92
Consequently, when Vladimir Putin declared in his speech of March 18
that “[a] referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance
with democratic procedures and international norms,”93 he was wrong.
More importantly, he had deployed a rhetorical style that would make a
negotiated resolution, or an undoing of the annexation of Crimea, more
difficult. By implying that under international law a referendum confers
upon the population of Crimea a right to secede, then anything less than
secession will be seen by some as bargaining away one’s rights. This makes
a negotiated solution difficult and can contribute to the intractability of the
conflict.94 It may be a savvy strategy to cement one particular outcome—
the absorption of Crimea in Russia—but it is dangerous in terms of later
effects. Much in the same way as Putin said of Western leaders that they
did not fully realize what they were doing with Kosovo, and that “the
second end of the stick” may hit them, one may say the same here of Putin.

91. Constitution of Ukraine, supra note 23, art. 73.
92. Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, supra note 22, art. 1.
93. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42.
94. For an example of the rhetoric, consider this report from CNN:
[L]lawmakers in Crimea voted in favor of leaving the country for Russia and putting it to
a regional vote in 10 days.
It’s an act that drew widespread condemnation, with Ukrainian interim Prime Minister
Arseniy Yatsenyuk calling the effort to hold such a referendum “an illegitimate decision.”
“Crimea was, is and will be an integral part of Ukraine,” he said.

Chelsea J. Carter, Laura Smith-Spark & Michael Holmes, Ukraine PM: Crimea “Was, Is and
Will Be an Integral Part of Ukraine,” CNN (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03
/06/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tensions/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.
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4. Recognition (But of What?)
Protracted arguments over secession typically transform into debates over
recognition and non-recognition.95 There are different types of recognition:
the recognition of statehood, of a government, of a belligerency and of
territorial change. Most secessionist conflicts become questions of
recognition of statehood. In the case of Crimea, at issue is whether Crimea
deserved to be recognized as a State, whether Russia’s recognition of
Crimea was illegal and the legal effects of Russia’s recognition.
States generally view the decision to recognize or not recognize an
entity as a State as a political decision, albeit one that exists within an
international legal framework. That legal framework is in part the norms
defining statehood. The standard view in international law is that a State
must have (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) a
government and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other States.96
While entities that claim statehood often try to do a quick “check the
box” summary of these criteria and maintain they have all the requirements
of statehood, the actual assessment is meant to be more rigorous than a
sound bite. At the time that Crimea declared independence, its territory
was completely contested—this was not an issue of where the border
between Crimea and Ukraine should be, but a dispute over the whole of
Crimea. Moreover, it was very much in doubt whether Crimea had a
functional government or the capacity to enter into international relations:
Crimea as a supposedly independent entity would not exist but for Russian
military intervention. And the control of Crimean territory seemed to be
more under the command of the Russian President than the Crimean
authorities.

95. Daniel Thürer, Self-Determination, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 364, 371 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000) (“Rather than formally recognizing a right of
secession . . . international law only became subsequently relevant within the context of
recognition.”).
96. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3097, 165 U.N.T.S. 19. One example of a national interpretation is Section 201 of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law: “Under international law, a state is an entity that
has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own
government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with
other such entities.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 201 (1987).
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What does the law of recognition have to say when it is doubtful that
Crimea even meets the basic requirements of statehood? Can Russia
nonetheless legally recognize Crimea as a State? While recognition is a
political act, it does not ignore legality. In the edition of James Brierly’s
treatise edited by Humphrey Waldock, the text states that
[i]t is impossible to determine by fixed rules the moment at which other
states may justly grant recognition of independence to a new state; it can
only be said that so long as a real struggle is proceeding, recognition is
premature, whilst, on the other hand, mere persistence by the old state in
a struggle which has obviously become hopeless is not a sufficient cause
for withholding it.97

Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote in his 1947 treatise Recognition in
International Law that non-recognition “is the minimum of resistance which
an insufficiently organized but law-abiding community offers to illegality; it
is a continuous challenge to a legal wrong.”98 The International Law
Association’s Committee of Recognition and Non-Recognition wrote in
their 2014 Interim Report:
One possible reason for not recognizing an entity as a state is that it was
formed through a territorial change from a use of force by one existing
State against another. Some have argued that “[t]hird States . . . may be
prevented from according recognition as long as the injured state does
not waive its rights since such a unilateral action would infringe the rights
of the latter State,” or that the lack of independence of an aspirant entity
in relation to some other State is cause for non-recognition.99

97. JAMES BRIERLY, The Law of Nations 138 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
1963).
98. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 431 (1947).
99. International Law Association Committee on Recognition and Non-recognition,
Interim Report 3 (Mar. 2014) (Christopher Borgen & Aziz Tuffi Saliba, co-rapporteurs),
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1032; then follow Conference Report 2014 Washington hyperlink [hereinafter ILA Recognition Committee
Interim Report], with internal citations to Karl Doehring, Effectiveness, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 43, 47 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995) and Jochen A.
Frowein, Recognition, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (Rudolph
Bernhardt ed., 2000). As co-rapporteur I participated in the drafting of, and deliberation
over, the quoted text.
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However, State practice has not given clear evidence of a general
obligation of non-recognition.100 Nonetheless, there is evidence of States
arguing that in particular circumstances recognition would be a violation of
international law. Most commonly noted are instances where secessionist
entities (a) have not met the criteria for statehood and/or (b) would be
against the views of the pre-existing State.101
Based on such criteria, Russia’s recognition of Crimea may have been a
breach of international law. First, as mentioned above, Crimea probably
did not meet the standards of statehood. Moreover, the facts that made
Crimea’s move towards independence possible were Russia’s stealthy (and
still unadmitted) intervention. Thus, the recognition would prolong
another illegality—a violation of the UN Charter norm of non-intervention
in domestic affairs. These were the types of argument that Russia itself
made against the recognition of Kosovo. In early 2009, Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov had referred to the “the unilateral—contrary to
100. ILA Recognition Committee Interim Report, supra note 99, at 4–6.
101. See id. at 5–7. Concerning U.S. practice, see, e.g., Russia Recognises Georgian Rebels,
BBC (Aug. 26, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7582181.stm (“Late on
Monday [August 25, 2008], the U.S. State Department had warned that recognition of the
two provinces’ independence would be ‘a violation of Georgian territorial integrity’ and
‘inconsistent with international law.’ In a statement, it said President George W Bush had
called on Russia's leadership to ‘meet its commitments and not recognise these separatist
regions.’”). Id. See also Press Statement, Embassy of the United States to Georgia, Acting
Deputy Spokesman, Mark C. Toner, Visit by Russian Officials to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (Apr. 30, 2011), available at http://georgia.usembassy.gov/latest-news/official-stat
ements-2011/russian_officials_abkhasia_s_ossetia.html (stating “Russia’s recent efforts to
conclude formal state-to-state agreements with the ‘de facto’ authorities in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia during a visit this week to those separatist regions are inconsistent with the
principle of territorial integrity and Georgia’s internationally recognized borders.”). West
Rejects Treaty Between Russia and Abkhazia, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Nov. 24,
2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-abkhazia-nato-european-union-united-states/26708819.html.
Certain European States are especially critical of secession and also argued that the
recognition would be a violation of international law. For example, the Cypriot Foreign
Minister warned against the EU “breaking international law” by recognizing Kosovo.
Harry de Quetteville & Bruno Waterfield, EU-US Showdown with Russia over Kosovo,
TELEGRAPH (London) (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
1572229/EU-US-showdown-with-Russia-over-Kosovo.html. And, on the day following
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Spain’s Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos
said, “We will not recognise [Kosovo] because we consider . . . this does not respect
international law.” Ingrid Melander, Spain Says Won’t Recognize Kosovo Independence, REUTERS
(Feb. 18, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/18/idUSL18645227.
253

International Law Studies

2015

international law—recognition of Kosovo’s independence” by certain
States.102
In any case, regardless of whether they view such recognition as
formally illegal, if other States perceive the recognition of an aspirant State
as premature, then they will likely withhold recognition. South Ossetia and
Abkhazia have each been recognized by four States: Russia, Venezuela,
Nicaragua and Vanuatu (Nauru and Tuvalu have withdrawn previous
statements of recognition). Other secessionist entities are in similar twilight
zones. No UN member States have recognized Transnistria or NagornoKarabakh. Northern Cyprus is recognized only by Turkey. Such twilight
regimes are unable to join the UN, or receive assistance from the World
Bank, or the International Monetary Fund. They do not participate in the
World Trade Organization. Each becomes the supplicant of whatever State
is most directly supporting them—Turkey, in the case of Northern Cyprus,
Armenia for Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia for South Ossetia, Abkhazia,
and Transnistria. By contrast Kosovo, which Russia has portrayed as a
prime example of illegal recognition, has been recognized—as of this
writing—by 110 States.103
But, unlike these other cases, Crimea never even started the game of
courting international recognition. Crimea began instead with a declaration
of independence that would automatically take effect upon a referendum
for independence. This was followed by a declaration of recognition by
Russia right after the referendum. And just over a day later Russia and
Crimea signed a treaty of merger. The recognition of Crimea by Russia was
the legal fig leaf which allowed Russia to say that it did not annex Crimea
from Ukraine, rather the Republic of Crimea exercised its sovereign
powers in seeking a merge with Russia.104
At issue now is not the non-recognition of an aspirant State, but rather
non-recognition of the territorial change of Russia. This alters the calculus
102. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Remarks and Response to
Questions at Press Conference on 2008 Foreign Policy Outcomes at MFA (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) (Jan. 16, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/AF09FEECD4A871A8C3257540005AECE3).
103. I undertake a longer comparison of the cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and
Abkhazia, in Borgen, Great Powers, Small States, and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination, supra
note 6.
104. Regarding mergers, see 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 62 at 210 (“Absorption or merger”) (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM’S (NINTH)].
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of power: there are many levers of power that one can use against an
aspirant State such as South Ossetia. Denying an aspirant State the benefits
of membership in the international community comes at little to no cost to
existing States. However, in the case of non-recognition of territorial
change, one would need to sanction the (already existing) State that has
undertaken this territorial change. While sanctioning an aspirant State may
be costly to the aspirant, sanctioning a powerful State may be costly to the
norm-enforcing States.
Thus, by quickly recognizing and then signing a treaty of merger with
Crimea, Russia accomplished three things: (a) it provided a veneer of
legality to its annexation of part of Ukraine, dubbing it a “reunification”;
(b) it avoided the costs of the non-recognition of Crimea as a State; and (c)
it increased the cost of enforcement by making Russia itself the party
against whom enforcement would need to be sought. At times the use of
legal language is an attempt to give other States a credible excuse not to act,
not to enforce legal norms when an argument can be made either that there
was no violation or that the situation is too complex to warrant precipitous
action.
Just as the experience of South Ossetia and Abkhazia provided a lesson
to Russia in how to manage the situation in Crimea,105 there are indications
that the experience in Crimea may have provided a lesson for Russia
regarding Abkhazia. After years of neglect there are indications that Russia
may now be moving towards annexing Abkhazia through a series of
treaties.106
C. A New Theory: Righting Historical Wrongs?
What may be most striking is the new direction of Russia’s argumentation
in the Crimean case. Russia only made passing reference to the language of
self-determination and instead used a rhetoric of history and ethnicity that
harkens back to pre-UN Charter norms. It remains to be seen whether
105. See, e.g., Michael Cecire, South Ossetia and Abkhazia Analysis, sidebar to Patrick
Jackson, Ukraine Crisis: “Frozen Conflicts” and the Kremlin, BBC (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www
.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29078541? (stating “Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia was in many ways self-defeating. One suspects the errors of this strategy at
least partially motivated the Russian decision to opt for direct annexation of Crimea rather
than ‘recognise’ yet another rump statelet.”).
106. See West Rejects Treaty Between Russia and Abkhazia, supra note 101.
255

International Law Studies

2015

Russia will continue to apply this line of reasoning in other cases in the
Near Abroad or if this truly is a “special case” and an anomaly. This shift in
rhetoric has not gone unnoticed by Russian international lawyers.
According to Anton Moiseienko, at a recent conference Professor Stanislav
Chernichenko “referred to the restoration of Russia’s ‘historic rights’ rather
than to Crimea’s self-determination (although he did not discard the latter
either). Indeed, he noted that Russia’s reliance on Kosovo’s precedent was
inconsistent with Russia’s own position on Kosovo.”107
This shift to an argument based on historical grievance was apparent in
the UN Press Office summary of Ambassador Churkin’s remarks in the
General Assembly’s March 27th debate on the resolution against Russia’s
annexation of Crimea:
Crimea had been reunified with the Russian Federation. “We call on
everyone to respect that voluntary choice,” he said, adding that his
Government could not refuse Crimeans their right to self-determination.
Historical justice had been vindicated, he noted, recalling that for many
years, Crimea had been part of the Russian Federation, sharing a
common history, culture and people. An arbitrary decision in 1954 had
transferred the region to the Ukrainian Republic, upsetting the natural
state of affairs and cutting Crimea off from Russia.108

107. Moiseienko, supra note 52. Chrenichenko is one of the co-authors of the article
in note 33 that included a comparison taken from a series of conferences in 2001 of
Russian, American and European views on self-determination.
108. General Assembly Adopts Resolution, supra note 2. In his March 18 speech,
President Putin said:
In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This
firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to
generation, over time, under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our
country went through during the entire 20th century.

Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42. One month later, Putin also made some brief
allusions to territorial irredentism regarding eastern Ukraine as well:
[O]n April 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin . . . suddenly began using the word
[Novorossiya] during his annual televised question-and-answer sessions with the nation.
“Under the tsars, this region was called Novorossiya,” he said. “These territories were
passed on to Ukraine in the 1920s. Why the Soviet government did that, may God judge
them.”

Caryl, supra note 65. But see Patricia Herlihy, Op-Ed., What Vladimir Putin Chooses not to
Know about Russian History, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 1, 2014), http://www.latimes
.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-herlihy-russia-ukraine-odessa-20140501-story.html.
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What had once seemed definite—Ukraine’s border—was now open to
question. Gone were the bright lines that Russia had said existed at the
time of the Kosovo debates: that inasmuch as Serbia did not consent to an
alteration of its territory and borders, there could be no legal recognition of
Kosovar independence. Gone was the talk of obligations of nonrecognition. Now we hear about returning things to their “natural state of
affairs.” But natural to whom? Russian positivist arguments were replaced
with notions of right based on history and ethnicity that verged on the
mystical.109
In the face of these historical yearnings and increasingly quasi-mystical
language is a tradition of black-letter law supporting territorial integrity.
The basic principle of the non-use of force and the respect of territorial
integrity is set out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: “All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
After the dissolution of the USSR, the 1991 Agreement Establishing
the Commonwealth of Independent States stated that Russia and other CIS
member States would respect “the inviolability of existing borders within
the Commonwealth.”110 Within two years, the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States was completed and signed and stated that its
members shall build their relation upon, among other things, “the
recognition of existing borders and the rejection of unlawful territorial

109. Putin said in his meeting with young historians in November 2014:
[F]or ethnic Russians (I mean that particular segment of our multi-ethnic peoples—ethnic,
Orthodox Russians), Crimea has a kind of sacred significance. After all, it was in Crimea,
in Hersonissos, that Prince Vladimir was baptised, subsequently baptising Rus. The first,
initial font of Russia’s Baptism is there.
And what is Hersonissos? It is Sevastopol. You can see the connection between the
spiritual source and state component, meaning the fight for Crimea overall and for
Sevastopol, for Hersonissos. In essence, the Russian people have been fighting for many
years to gain a firm foothold in its historical font. This is extremely important.

Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Remarks Meeting with Young Academics and History
Teachers (Nov. 5, 2014) (transcript available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president
/news/46951).
110. Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States art. 5, Dec.
8, 1991, 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 143, 144 (1992); Summers, supra note 74,
at 111.
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annexations.”111 In addition, upon Ukraine’s joining the non-proliferation
treaty and transferring the nuclear weapons on its territory, Russia, the
United States and the United Kingdom signed, along with Ukraine, a
security agreement known as “the Budapest Memorandum,” which stated
that the parties “reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with
the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the Independence and
Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.”112
These treaty commitments further underscore customary international
law obligations to respect territorial integrity and the non-violability of
borders. Also relevant is the more specific concept uti possidetis juris.113
Originally used in the decolonization of Latin America in the nineteenth
century, uti possidetis meant that borders of former colonies that achieved
independence would mirror their previous colonial boundaries. This
principle was subsequently applied in the decolonizations of the twentieth
century, and, with greater controversy, to the newly independent States
after the end of the Cold War. In this last case, the Badinter Commission
found that the exercise of self-determination “must not involve changes to
existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except
where the States concerned agree otherwise.”114 This is reiterated in
Opinion 3, which notes that uti possidetis has become recognized as a
“general principle” of international law.115 The Helsinki Final Act also
provided for inviolability of borders and forbade the acquisition of another

111. Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States art. 3, Jan. 22, 1993, 1819
U.N.T.S. 58, reprinted in 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1279, 1283–84 (1995). See
also Summers, supra note 74, at 111.
112. Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Dec. 5, 1994, reprinted in
A/49/765, S/1994/1399, annex I (Dec. 19, 1994), available at http://en.wikisource.org
/wiki/Ukraine._Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances.
113. See generally OPPENHEIM’S (NINTH), supra note 104, §235 at 669–70 (“Uti
possidetis”). For a detailed discussion of the history of uti possidetis, see Evison, supra note 82,
at 92–99.
114. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 2, supra note 7.
115. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 3, 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1499 (1992). The ICJ had also written in Burkina Faso v. Mali that uti possidetis “is not a
special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law. It is a general
principle which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of
independence, wherever it occurs.” Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554,
¶ 20 (Dec. 22).
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State’s territory through the threat or the actual use of “direct or indirect
measures of force in contravention of international law.”116
As the USSR dissolved in the closing days of 1991, it was replaced by
fifteen new States, all former Union republics.117 As new States they were
entitled to territorial integrity. But, of course, there is the possibility of
dispute over what should be the relevant borders. The principle of uti
possidetis is of use in such situations by delimiting the relevant State borders
as being those of the pre-existing colony or (based on the Badinter
Commission’s extension of the principle) pre-existing administrative
boundary. Consequently, in addition to treaty-based obligations, Russia has
the obligation under customary international law to respect the pre-existing
boundaries of Ukraine. Due to uti possidetis (as well as the numerous treaties
if had signed) this would include Crimea (and, of course, all of eastern
Ukraine).
Russia’s new emphasis on irredentist rhetoric does not reflect the actual
substance of international law. One country cannot unravel another
country’s internationally recognized statehood with some vague references
to a preferred historical “natural state of affairs.” To the contrary,
international legal doctrines of sovereignty, effective dates of boundaries
and non-intervention deliberately do not give weight to such historical
grievances because almost every country can point to some past wrong and
some previous territorial distribution that they believe is more just.
International law is not an invitation to troll through history and
unilaterally change whatever territorial distribution you think is wrong.
Despite the weight of treaty law and customary international law,
looking back on the 1990’s President Putin explained, “Russia seemed to
have recognized Crimea as part of Ukraine, but there were no negotiations

116. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act princ. 3, 4, Aug.
1, 1975, 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1292, 1294 (1975), available at
http://www.osce.org/mc/39501.
117. Under the Soviet Constitution, there were differing levels of administrative
order. “Union republics” had the highest form of sovereignty within the USSR. When the
USSR dissolved, the Union republics such as Russia, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Ukraine became new sovereign States. “Autonomous republics” such as Abkhazia (in
Georgia), North Ossetia and the Chechen-Ingush Republic (both in Russia), did not have
that level of sovereignty; they were subsidiary entities. “Oblasts” or regions, included
South Ossetia and Adjaria (both in Georgia) and similarly had a lower level of rights than
Union republics. See generally Summers, supra note 74, at 92.
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to limit borders.”118 Regardless as to whether or not there were protracted
negotiations, Russia signed multiple treaties with obligations to respect
those borders. As the ICJ wrote in its Temple of Preah Vihear decision: “In
general, when two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the
primary objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is impossible if the
line so established can, at any moment, on the basis of a continuously
available process, be called into question.”119 U.S. Ambassador to the UN
Samantha Power captured this sense when she stated: “We also stand with
international law and norms and the fundamental principle that borders are
not suggestions.”120
Given these obligations, it is of little surprise that Russia decided to
adopt a completely different framing of the issues in its annexation of
Crimea. This disjuncture with much international legal discourse does not
mean that Russia’s recent arguments should be ignored:
This kind of ethnic mysticism is difficult for Westerners to understand.
Complacently confident of the universality of Western liberal values, they
regard such thinking as the product of a benighted age. [Canadian] Prime
Minister Stephen Harper, for instance, referred to the Russian leader as a
“throwback” to the era of 19th century imperialism following the
Crimean annexation. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry declared Putin to
be on the “wrong side of history.” But arguably it is Harper and Kerry
whose comprehension of history is out of whack. They, like other
Western leaders, continue to assume the end of the Cold War ensure[s]
the coming-to-be of a new world order that would eventually see liberal
democracy and Western values encircle the globe.121

Russia’s irredentist rhetoric is popular both within Russia and in certain
other separatist regions in its Near Abroad.122 The West needs to
remember that it is not the only one listening to what Russia is saying. The
118. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42. (emphasis added).
119. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 34 (June 15). See also
FRANCK, FAIRNESS, supra note 15, at 153.
120. Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Remarks at a Security Council Meeting on Ukraine (Apr. 13, 2014) (transcript
available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/224764.htm).
121. Robert Sibley, The Expansionist Behind Putin, OTTAWA CITIZEN (May 2, 2014),
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/the-expansionist-behind-putin.
122. See, e.g., Moldova’s Trans-Dniester Region Pleads to Join Russia, BBC (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26627236.
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West may not even be the primary audience to whom Russia is speaking.
And Russia’s rhetoric can frame expectations about what is or is not
acceptable under international law.
IV. STRATEGY: THE UKRAINE CRISIS AND THE USES OF LEGAL RHETORIC
Part II considered the current state of the law of self-determination. With
the law as background, Part III examined how Russia uses rhetoric that
claims to be based on international law in its public statements about
Crimea. Comparing Russia’s arguments in the six years between Kosovo
and Crimea, it analyzed the shifts in Russia’s arguments from case to case.
Part IV will suggest possible reasons why Russia has changed its legal
rhetoric.
A. Explaining Russia’s Use of Legal Argument
Considering Russia’s statements regarding Kosovo, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, and Crimea, a few themes are apparent in how Russia’s rhetoric
about self-determination and sovereignty has changed.
Sovereignty becomes ephemeral. The most significant change in Russia’s
shifting rhetoric is that State sovereignty loses its central place. This has
two related aspects in Russia’s arguments concerning self-determination
and secession. The first is that sovereignty moved from being the core
value that was protected by international law, to simply a fact that may or
may not come into play in a particular circumstance.
The “will of the people” is redefined. The second aspect is Russia’s pivot
away from focusing on sovereign rights and towards a specific
understanding of the phrase “will of the people.” Russia reconceptualized
“will of the people” from being the preferences of the total population of
the pre-existing State (Serbia, in the case of the Kosovo crisis) to just that
of the population of the separatist enclave. This new interpretation became
evident in Russia’s arguments justifying its intervention in Georgia in
support of the separatists.
A new emphasis on correcting historical wrongs. In the Kosovo crisis, Russia’s
argument was an explanation why self-determination does not lead to a
right of secession. It was an argument that had much support in terms of
general State practice, but which did not sit easily with Russia’s direct
assistance to separatist militias in conflict with the governments of
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Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan. Russia’s rhetoric regarding Crimea is
not about territorial integrity but territorial irredentism.
Embracing the “special case” terminology. After sharply criticizing the United
States and certain European countries for repeatedly arguing that Kosovo
does not set a precedent because it is a “special case,”123 Russia adopted
this rhetoric itself, regarding Crimea.124
These new arguments mark a break with Russia’s earlier statements and
State practice. From 1991–2008, Russia supported certain separatist
movements in its Near Abroad but did not grant recognition to any of
these entities. Since Kosovo’s declaration, Russia has recognized three:
South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea. However, this is not merely a case of
“turnabout is fair play.” Russia continues to attempt to clothe its
arguments in legalistic language, even though, according to Lauri Mälksoo,
the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation goes against pretty
much everything that has been written in Russia over the last twenty years
(plus during the Soviet period) on the legality of the use of military force
and the right or peoples to self-determination in international law in noncolonial contexts.125

The Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs had previously argued against
novel legal arguments:

123. For example, Vladimir Putin said in his March 18th speech concerning Crimea:
We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special
case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is the fact
that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties. Is this a legal argument?
The ruling of the International Court says nothing about this. This is not even double
standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to
make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black
tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human
losses.

Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42.
124. Lavrov said in a September 2014 interview: “I believe that Crimea was a very
special case, a unique case from all points of view. Historically, geopolitically, and
patriotically, if you wish. The situation in the southeast of Ukraine is different. There is
nothing like the unity we saw in Crimea.” Lavrov Interview, supra note 44.
125. Lauri Mälksoo, Crimea and (the Lack of) Continuity in Russian Approaches to
International Law, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-and-thelack-of-continuity-in-russian-approaches-to-international-law/.
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[A]ttempts to represent violations of international law as its “creative”
application are dangerous. It is unacceptable that military interventions
and other forms of interference from without which undermine the
foundations of international law based on the principle of sovereign
equality of states, be carried out on the pretext of implementing the
concept of “responsibility to protect.”126

So why use the language of international law? International law is the
vocabulary of modern diplomacy; it is the lingua franca. International law
defines the common terms of discourse. Some terms, such as a “place in
the sun” or “sphere of influence” used to be part of the accepted
vocabulary of international relations. No longer. Now States must make
arguments based on common concepts such as “self-determination” and
“territorial integrity.”
Additionally, beyond defining the language of diplomacy, international
law sets the rules for which words make sense when used together and
which do not. It is a grammar of international relations.127 States do not
talk about the “right” to commit “aggression” or the “remedy” of piracy.
These sentences do not make sense when the words are used in
conjunction with each other.
The long debate over self-determination and secession is about
defining these terms (especially self-determination) and coming to a
consensus as to their grammatical relationship. Russia went from saying
that they were only weakly related (at least up through the Kosovo
debates), to claiming that they are more strongly related and almost
synonymous (South Ossetia) to all but discarding these terms and bringing
in a whole new vocabulary when talking about Crimea.
Diplomatic arguments are a means to an end. They are part of a
strategy. Russia’s ultimate goal in its Near Abroad seems to be to maintain
the image, if not the reality, of great power status. Ulrich Speck of Carnegie
Europe put it this way:

126. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Concept of the Foreign Policy
of the Russian Federation ¶ 31(b) (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/
0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D.
127. Martti Koskenniemi has described the grammar of international law as “the
system of production of good legal arguments.” MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY
TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 568 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2005) (1989).
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Seeing itself as a classical great power, Russia wants to maximize its
sovereignty and freedom to act. It does not compare itself to countries
like Japan, India, Germany or France, which have integrated into the
global system by accepting U.S. leadership. Instead, Russia, even with
very limited power resources (besides nuclear weapons) takes the United
States as the benchmark of its position in the international system.
Moscow does not seek deep engagement with international institutions
and international rules, it looks at them merely as instruments to
aggrandize its power. What counts is power in an archaic sense: the ability
to force others to do what one wants. The strong can command, the
weak must obey.128

Western analysts contend that Russia’s ultimate goal is reflected in
policies and intermediate goals such as:
•
•
•
•

attempting to halt the “expansion” of Western institutions in
eastern Europe;
supporting construction of Moscow-led institutions;
maintaining a certain level of control over the foreign policies
of the former Soviet countries in its Near Abroad; and,
acting as a guarantor for the millions of ethnic Russians who
reside in former Soviet republics.

The language of international law, and especially of self-determination,
can be instrumental in pursuing these intermediate goals. Consequently,
strategic shifts in emphasis among these intermediate goals may drive the
changing rhetoric in international legal arguments.
B. International Legal Argument as an Instrument of Foreign Policy
1. Self-Determination Crises as a Means to Hamper an Accession to
Western International Institutions
The 1990s and early 2000s were a time of international institution building
and expansion, especially in Europe. The EU added new members from
eastern Europe and NATO expanded eastward as well, admitting former
128. Ulrich Speck, Russia and Germany: The Antipodes in the International System, EURASIA
OUTLOOK (Nov. 25, 2014), http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=57311.
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members of the Warsaw Pact. There was optimistic talk in the West of
European institutions one day reaching from the Atlantic to the Urals, if
not the Pacific, with Russia as a member.
But there was little celebration among certain political leaders in
Moscow. Anger and frustration over the expansion of NATO into eastern
Europe became a key theme in Russian foreign policy. It was one that
Putin reiterated in various statements and it was even part of his speech on
Crimea:
[T]hey [Western countries] have lied to us many times, made decisions
behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened
with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of
military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing:
“Well, this does not concern you.” That’s easy to say.129

As President Putin’s chief spokesperson put it in November 2014, “[w]e
have our red lines.”130
European leaders maintained that accession to a treaty is an issue only
between the acceding country and the current parties to the treaty.
Consequently, as a matter of international law, Russia does not have veto
power over another sovereign State joining a treaty regime to which Russia
is not already a party.
While this is correct as a matter of law, as a matter of power projection
Russia has the ability to affect the political situation within these States
seeking admission to Western institutions. In the run-up to the European
Union’s summit in Vilnius in November 2013, when Ukraine was originally
supposed to sign its association agreement with the EU, Russian politicians
issued warnings that if Ukraine did not reject the EU treaty, Ukraine would
run the risk of Russia supporting the partitioning of Ukraine to protect
ethnic Russians residing there.131 Civil unrest was not an issue at the time,
only Ukraine agreeing to sign the association agreement.
Russia’s leadership apparently thought that a self-determination dispute
could slow Ukraine’s integration into Western international institutions.
129. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42.
130. We have our Red Lines, BBC (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-30113821.
131. Russia Threatens to Back Ukraine Split, TIMES (London) (Sept. 23, 2013), http://w
ww.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article3876103.ece.
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The specter of a secessionist crisis, arising from attempts to further
integrate with Western institutions, may have dampened the enthusiasm in
the Ukrainian citizenry for such integration. Regardless as to whether
secessionism would change Ukrainian public opinion, there was also the
possibility that neither NATO nor the EU would have the political will to
accept a country embroiled in a secessionist conflict. Although the
association agreement was not the same as accession, there was clearly the
concern on Russia’s part (and the hope on the part of many Ukrainians)
that association would be an important step on a road to accession. Both
the EU treaty and the NATO Charter require unanimous approval for a
State to join as a new member. A conflict in Ukraine could make it more
difficult to garner the required votes should accession to either of these
organizations ever become an issue.
It was also in Russia’s interest to frame the conflict as a selfdetermination crisis within Ukraine as opposed to a Russia objecting to
Ukraine’s closer association with the EU and NATO. European
institutions have evolved a practice for addressing self-determination
disputes in countries in the former USSR, other than in Russia. This is an
example of an intervention strategy called “norm setting,” which “involves
the setting of ‘rules of the game’ in which the standards by which the
legitimacy of self-determination claims, and ultimately state recognition, are
spelled out by the international community and thereafter enforced in
some way.”132 Ideally, norm-setting is a multilateral activity defining the
rules of the relevant community of states.133
However, Russia is according itself the central role as the norm definer
and interpreter for its Near Abroad. Russia is (or was) a stakeholder in the
mediations over Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Georgia. And it is
now part of mediation over the future of eastern Ukraine. By being a
mediator as well as having “boots on the ground” in most of these

132. Eileen F. Babbitt, Self-Determination as a Component of Conflict Intractability:
Implications for Negotiation, in NEGOTIATING SELF DETERMINATION 115, 118 (Hurst
Hannum & Eileen F. Babbitt eds., 2006).
133. Eileen Babbitt wrote, “[t]he benefits of . . . normative interventions [such as UN
General Assembly Resolution 1514 and the work of the Badinter Commission] are
potentially very great. At best, they can create the standard against which selfdetermination claims, and States’ responses to them, are evaluated by the international
community.” Id. at 118–19.
266

Law, Rhetoric, Strategy

Vol. 91

conflicts,134 Russia is able to exert significant structural power in framing
possible endgames, including issues related to the foreign policies of the
pre-existing States.
This would not be possible to the same extent if Russia annexed the
territory. There needs to be an ongoing conflict requiring mediation.
Consequently, once Crimea was annexed the viability (and credibility) of
any mediation regime decreased. As one commentator put it: “When the
Kremlin gave in to the temptation to annex Crimea, it became necessary to
replace it with another conflict, in the east. It is against the Kremlin’s
interests to annex territory because an unresolved dispute gives it the
opportunity to influence the country involved.”135
And thus we now have Russia’s call for a mediation process for eastern
Ukraine, which was explicitly linked to broader security issues. President
Putin said in August 2014:
There need to be negotiations of substance. [Foreign Minister] Lavrov
was here, and the diplomats love this term. Negotiations need to work
out in substance what rights the people in Donbass, Lugansk and the
entire southeast of Ukraine will have. Their lawful rights and interests
must be formulated and guaranteed within the framework of modern
civilised rules. These are the issues that need to be discussed. From there
I am sure it will be relatively easy to settle matters concerning the border,
guaranteeing security and so on. But the problem is that they do not
really want to talk.136

Thus, fostering self-determination conflicts in its Near Abroad, could
be a gambit to slow integration of these countries into Western institutions.
Framing these disputes as questions of self-determination led to a response
that gave Russia a “seat at the table,” when previously it had none. If
anything, Russia moved from being an outsider to a necessary party in
regards to the future foreign relations of these countries. And, with the
region, if not the world, as its audience, responding to these conflicts gave
Russia the opportunity to use the persuasive rhetoric of self-determination

134. DOV LYNCH, ENGAGING EURASIA’S SEPARATIST STATES: UNRESOLVED
CONFLICTS AND DE FACTO STATES 21 (2004) (referring to Russia as a “mediator-cumsupporter-cum-combatant”).
135. Jackson, supra note 105.
136. Putin, August Comments, supra note 83.
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to frame its perspective of what was and was not allowed under
international law.
2. Legal Arguments as a Means to Support Hybrid Warfare
Russia’s strategy in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has been an amalgamation
of stealth invasion and quasi-legal rhetoric. The “stealth” part of the
invasion was to maintain a fig-leaf of deniability and to make the uprising
in eastern Ukraine seem homegrown, as opposed to Russian-led. This
strategy of stealth interlocks with Russia’s rhetoric, a quasi-legal/nationalist
amalgamation that attempts to persuade those who can be persuaded and
befuddle those who cannot. The rhetoric of self-determination cloaks a
covert operation. Russia has used such “hybrid warfare” to foster
intractable conflicts elsewhere in its Near Abroad.137
One commentator described the combination of covert and clandestine
activities involved in hybrid warfare:
Leading this defense [of Russia’s “ideological and physical sovereignty”]
are the elite Spetsnaz and GRU intelligence officers that, as NYU
Professor Mark Galeotti noted, “The GRU has also shown the rest of the
world how Russia expects to fight its future wars: with a mix of stealth,
deniability, subversion, and surgical violence.” The confusing nature of
low intensity conflicts and the pliability of truth mean that these soldiers
and operatives are the ideal force for these conflicts. These are the men
who are trained and equipped to navigate the shifting alliances, battle
lines and publicly deniable spaces in furtherance of Russia’s political
objectives.138

137. One recent press report states:
For Michael Cecire, the unorthodox and varied methods Russia has used in eastern
Ukraine, described as “hybrid warfare,” have been deployed before “across the Russian
periphery.”
“In Georgia, Moldova and even Azerbaijan, Moscow has helped cultivate conditions to
foment vocal sentiments favouring separatism even in situations where the population is
far from a consensus, as polls in Ukraine have shown,” he says.

Jackson, supra note 105.
138. Andrew Bowen, The Vanguard of Russia’s New Foreign Policy, THE INTERPRETER
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.interpretermag.com/the-vanguard-of-russias-new-foreignpolicy/ (internal link/citation omitted).
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Hybrid warfare is part of a broader strategy of “reflexive control,”
which “convey[s] to a partner or an opponent specially prepared
information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision
desired by the initiator of the action.”139 Part of this is a matter of
deception and disinformation, but it goes well beyond that. The
development of reflexive control theory in Soviet military literature dates
back to the 1960s.140 Some of its precursors are decades older. The Russian
military established a school on deception in 1904, which was disbanded in
1929.141 Today reflexive control is emphasized by instructors at Russia’s
General Staff Academy and it is even the subject of a new journal founded
in 2001.142 As Timothy Thomas put it, “[i]n a war in which reflexive control
is being employed, the side with the highest degree of reflex (the side best
able to imitate the other side’s thoughts or predict its behavior) will have
the best chances of winning.”143
Consider this like defining your opponent’s path without them even
realizing it: you will know where they will end up, perhaps even before they
do. International legal arguments can frame issues such that there is
increasing predictability as to how other parties will react. As described
above, European powers had a particular way of approaching selfdetermination crises. By framing a conflict in this manner, Russia could
anticipate the likely responses (multilateral mediation, for example).
Moreover, defining the legal framework can play an important role in
the actual substantive outcome. Martti Koskenniemi wrote that “[a]bstract
standards (such as self-determination) justify recognition policies that
create the reality they purport to reflect” such that sometimes it is a general
adherence to a norm that does more to bring about statehood than
effective control of territory.144
The use of international legal rhetoric in general, and framing an issue
as a self-determination struggle in particular, can put other actors, such as
the United States and the EU, on the wrong foot, making it difficult to
139. Timothy Thomas, Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military, 17 JOURNAL OF
SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 237, 237 (2004). My thanks to Major John J. Merriam of the
U.S. Naval War College for introducing me to the concept of “reflexive control” and
suggesting how it could be applicable to my analysis.
140. Id. at 238.
141. Id. at 239.
142. Id. at 237, 239.
143. Id. at 242.
144. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 127, at 576.
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marshal an effective response. According to a study produced for the
National Defense Academy of Latvia, one aspect of the “new generation
warfare” strategies used by Russia is “strongly adhering to legalism.”145 The
study explains:
Without discussing the legal merit of Russian actions, they were all
backed by some form of legal act. Putin asked the Russian parliament for
authorization to use military power in the Ukraine if necessary. Naturally,
it was granted. Russia uses this fact together with the argument that it
never used military power in Crimea as a sign of its peaceful intentions.
Third, Russia denies the idea of it having militarily occupied Crimea, since
the troops there were local self-defense forces. In addition, that although
it is true that the number of troops stationed there increased, this is still
within the limits of the bilateral agreement between Russia and
Ukraine.146

The use of the rhetoric of self-determination can be used to befuddle
and confuse treaty obligations and military strategy. The Latvian National
Defense Academy paper notes that NATO member State obligations of
collective self-defense are predicated on an “armed attack” on a member
State. But legal rhetoric can be used to sow seeds of doubt as to whether
there even was an armed attack:
Supposing a Crimea-like situation occurs in Narva, Estonia, for example.
Can Article 5 be called on if there is no armed attack, but instead, what
Russia would call a “democratic right of self-determination of the same
nature as Kosovo and Crimea”? How should this issue be managed:
militarily or politically?147

Besides making it difficult for opponents to organize a response,
defining a conflict through the optic of self-determination can rally local
populations. While in some cases (Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, for
example), these conflicts had deep local roots that predated Russian
involvement, the heating up and boiling over of Crimea seems to have
145. Jānis Bērziņš, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian
Defense Policy 3, National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic
Research Policy Paper No. 2 (Apr. 2014).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 8.
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been because Russia was manning the stove. In either scenario, couching a
conflict as a struggle for self-determination, including a right to secession,
can bolster support within local populations.
Certain separatists undoubtedly have honest aspirations for statehood
and a desire to defend what they understand to be their rights flowing from
self-determination. But they were coaxed by a rhetoric that distorted what
self-determination actually means. The language of self-determination thus
assists hybrid warfare by rallying local forces, cloaking their actions in a
language of rights and democracy, and providing cover for Russia to
intervene both as a belligerent and as a mediator.
For a sense of the pairing of hybrid warfare with offers of mediation,
consider this description of conflict in Georgia:
In order to be able to deny the invasion of Russian troops, it was first
stated that some villages on the Georgian frontier had revolted,
embittered by the tyranny of the Georgians. . . . Simultaneously, Abkhazia
had risen in the extreme northwest, close to the Russian border.
It is a remarkable fact that the rebellions broke out precisely in those
places . . . where large and constantly increasing masses of Russian troops
had been quartered since November. . . .
The Russian Government stated it had endeavored, out of love of peace
and benevolence, to help the threatened Georgian regime, and offered its
mediation between the Georgians and the Armenians. It could not help it
if Georgia contemptuously rejected this mediation.148

Pause for a moment to consider that this was not written about the
Russian intervention of 2008. It was written about the Red Army’s
intervention in 1921.
C. The Multiple Audiences of International Legal Arguments in the Ukraine Crisis
One of the reasons the intractable conflicts of the Russian Near Abroad
are complex is the multiple parties involved in each conflict. There are the
secessionists, the pre-existing State, EU member States, the United States
148. Georgia: 1921, DISSENT (Aug. 16, 2008), http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online
_articles/georgia-1921 (excerpting KARL KAUTSKY, GEORGIA: A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC
PEASANT REPUBLIC, IMPRESSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS (1921)).
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and, of course, Russia. There are also key Russian allies, such as
Kazakhstan and China who are interested in either the conflict itself or, at
least, how Russia acts in relation to the conflict. And there is the Russian
public. Consequently, when Russia uses legal rhetoric, it is in part speaking
to one or more international audiences, but the arguments also serve a
purpose in the domestic political game.149
1. International Legal Argument and Domestic Politics: Addressing
Russia’s Citizens
Putin has noted repeatedly the domestic popularity of Russian policy vis-àvis Crimea. In his August 2014 speech, after noting that the people of
Crimea expressed their will in a referendum, Putin continued: “I feel we
protected [the Crimeans]. And all this has truly greatly united us, including
the opposition parties that are fairly critical of the authorities in power,
critically assessing the actions of the authorities with regard to politics and
the economy.”150
This is part of a broader political dialogue in Russia that emphasizes
Russian cultural exceptionalism and, really, a heroic place for Russia in
world affairs.151 National leaders always want to portray their country not
only as strong, but also as just. Vladimir Putin is no different. As he
pursued what he seemingly believed to be in Russia’s strategic interest by
annexing Crimea and fostering unrest in eastern Ukraine, he explained to
the Russian citizenry why these are actions not only of a great power, but
of a moral power. He contrasted this with what he described as the
hypocrisy and cynicism of the West. Rather than oscillating away from
149. Concerning two-level games, see generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 427
(1988).
150. Putin, August Comments, supra 83.
151. Mark Galeotti and Andrew S. Bowen wrote:
Perhaps the world should have paid more attention when Putin made 2014 Russia’s “Year
of Culture.” This was to be when the country celebrated its unique identity—a year of
“emphasis on our cultural roots, patriotism, values, and ethics.” It was nothing less than a
recipe for a new Russian exceptionalism, one that Putin himself would craft and impose.
Seen in those terms, the turmoil in Ukraine did not merely allow him to step in—it
demanded it.

Mark Galeotti & Andrew S. Bowen, Putin’s Empire of the Mind, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 21,
2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/21/putins-empire-of-the-mind/.
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international law, Putin claims that Russia is actually supporting the United
Nations and international legality (as President Bush claimed when the
United States invaded Iraq in 2003).
Sovereignty itself becomes redefined in such a way that aggrandizes the
scope of Russian sovereignty while minimizing sovereignty claims of postSoviet States. In effect, the sovereignty of the countries of the Near
Abroad are subject to Russia’s interests:
This ideological Putin is also a more forceful iteration that is increasingly
comfortable using Russia’s military to massage, intimidate and even
outright invade its neighbors to re-assert its dominance and to defend
Putin’s conception of Russia’s exceptionalism, and most importantly, its
sovereignty.
Yet this sovereignty is not just of Russia’s borders, it is also the Russian
identity, free from the perversions and influence of the West. It is a
celebration and a call to defend what makes Russia different and
unique.152

This, in turn, reinforces a sense of difference in Russians’ view of what is,
or is not, part of international law. In this way, Russia’s reconceptualization
of international law is used not only to rally separatists in Ukraine, but also
its own citizens in Russia.
2. Addressing the Near Abroad
Besides frustration with expanding Western institutions, another recurring
theme is the concern over Russian populations who, in the wake of the
dissolution of the USSR, are now ethnic minorities in newly independent
States. The historian Timothy Garton Ash recounts the following:
In 1994, I was half asleep at a round table in St. Petersburg, Russia, when
a short, thickset man with a rather ratlike face—apparently a sidekick of
the city’s mayor—suddenly piped up. Russia, he said, had voluntarily
given up “huge territories” to the former republics of the Soviet Union,
including areas “which historically have always belonged to Russia.” He
152. Andrew Bowen, The Vanguard of Russia’s New Foreign Policy, THE INTERPRETER
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.interpretermag.com/the-vanguard-of-russias-new-foreignpolicy/.
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was thinking “not only about Crimea and northern Kazakhstan, but also
for example about the Kaliningrad area.” Russia could not simply
abandon to their fate those “25 million Russians” who now lived abroad.
The world had to respect the interests of the Russian state “and of the
Russian people as a great nation.”
The name of this irritating little man was—you guessed it—Vladimir V.
Putin . . . .153

This rhetoric has been elevated from comments at conferences to
diplomatic arguments in Security Council debates. Ambassador Anatoly
Churkin explained to the Council that “[h]istorically, Russia was the
guarantor of the security of the people of the Caucasus, and it will remain
so.”154 Foreign Minister Lavrov wrote in 2009 that “[w]e cannot regard
people as an ‘adjunct’ of whoever’s territory that may arbitrarily, without
their consent, pass under the sovereignty of a State in breach of the
principles of international law . . . .”155
Such a sense of prerogatives implies the existence of a Russian sphere
of influence in its Near Abroad.156 Russia, however, argues that it is
upholding popular democracy in the face of encroaching Western interests
through expanding institutions, corporate power and fake “color
revolutions.” In practice, the rhetoric of Russia as regional protector means
that Russia jealously guards its own sovereign prerogatives, while
simultaneously exercising a policy as if the States in its Near Abroad had
“only a diminished sovereignty.”157

153. Timothy Garton Ash, Putin’s Deadly Doctrine: “Protecting” Russians in Ukraine Has
Fatal Consequences, NEW YORK TIMES (July 18, 2014), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/07
/20/opinion/sunday/protecting-russians-in-ukraine-has-deadly-consequences.html?refer
rer=&_r=0.
154. Summers, supra note 74, at 92 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5952 mtg. at 5,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.5952 (Aug. 2, 2008). See also U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5969th mtg. at 17,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.5969 (Aug. 28, 2008).
155. Lavrov, YEARBOOK, supra note 78.
156. “Sphere of influence” is not part of the modern grammar of international law.
157. Stephen Blank, American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, 163 WORLD
AFFAIRS 65, 66 (2000). This in turn has led to States openly discussing leaving the CIS and
also to the establishment of new subgroupings to counterbalance the CIS, such as GUAM,
made up of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.
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Although this language may comfort Russian populations in the Near
Abroad, it can be a source of anxiety for the leaders of those countries.
The president of Kazakhstan said that:
If the rules set forth in the agreement are not followed, Kazakhstan has a
right to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union. I have said this
before and I am saying this again. Kazakhstan will not be part of
organizations that pose a threat to our independence. Our independence
is our dearest treasure, which our grandfathers fought for. First of all, we
will never surrender it to someone, and secondly, we will do our best to
protect it . . . .158

3. Addressing Allies: China
This sense of “diminished sovereignty” is an issue that was of particular
concern to China. China is a crucial partner in Moscow’s hope to build the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) into a Eurasian counterweight
to the “Atlanticist” power of Western Europe and the United States.159
Consequently, Russia does not want to take positions that would drive a
wedge into its relationship China. This makes the rhetoric of selfdetermination a delicate issue.
China has no interest in supporting secessionism. To the contrary, part
of the SCO’s mission statement is actually to counter separatism.160 China
has even provided “political cover” for smaller States in the region to
reaffirm the law of territorial integrity in the face of Russian calls for
support for South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence.161
This may further explain why in the Crimean case Russia shifted away
from the language of self-determination and secession and towards a
history-based argument emphasizing deep local linkages, calling Crimea “a
158. Assel Satubaldina, Kazakhstan May Leave EEU if its Interests are Infringed:
Nazarbayev, TENGRI NEWS (Aug. 27, 2014), http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_ sub/Ka
zakhstan-may-leave-EEU-if-its-interests-are-infringed-Nazarbayev-255722/.
159. Regarding Russia’s relationships to its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation
organization, see ALEXANDER COOLEY, GREAT GAMES, LOCAL RULES 74–96 (2012).
160. Id. at 83.
161. Id. See also Rima Tkatova, Post-Soviet States and International Law in a Multipolar
World, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD, supra note 74, at 256 (stating
the SCO was cautious on the recognition of South Ossetia, “without condemning or
approving the actions of Russia.”).
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very special case.”162 Such historically-contingent arguments could be an
attempt to assuage China’s concerns about separatism and to signal that
Russia’s rhetoric should not affect China’s interests. Putin specifically
mentioned China in his speech on Crimea:
At the same time, we are grateful to all those who understood our actions
in Crimea; we are grateful to the people of China, whose leaders have
always considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea taking into
account the full historical and political context, and greatly appreciate
India’s reserve and objectivity.163

This may have been an effective rhetorical balm regarding Crimea.
However, a return to the rhetoric of secession and self-determination
regarding eastern Ukraine may worry China’s leaders:
Chinese media commentary has become more cautious since Putin
moved on from Crimea to stirring the pot in eastern Ukraine. China’s
nationalist paper Global Times, which last month spoke of “Crimea's
return to Russia,” now warns: “Ukraine's eastern region is different from
the Crimea. Secession of the region from Ukraine strikes a direct blow to
territorial integrity guaranteed by international law.”164

Moreover, Russia’s “very special case” rhetoric may suffer from the
same “second end of the stick” problem for which it criticized the West’s
“special case” arguments concerning Kosovo. Once arguments are made in
diplomatic fora, they can take on a life of their own. Other groups,
movements and States may adopt such rhetoric and use it for their own
purposes, much as Russia did with the West’s justifications for Kosovo. As
Grewe noted, the arguments of great powers have a way of shaping the
effective international law of the time. This is one reason why Russia’s
rhetoric concerning international law is important. If arguments that
decrease the threshold for intervention and military force go unanswered,
then other States and non-State actors may start to act accordingly.

162. Lavrov Interview, supra note 44.
163. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42.
164. Ash, Protecting Russians, supra note 153.
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4. The “Farther Away”
With the traditional focus on how legal rhetoric affects those in Russia’s
Near Abroad, we perhaps forget that it can also play a role in addressing
those States that either are not geographically near the conflict or do not
have a particular political interest in relation to it. Rather than the “Near
Abroad,” consider them the “Farther Away.”
The rhetoric of international law can possibly persuade some States, or
public opinion in foreign countries that a particular party is simply
defending its rights. For example: “why shouldn’t the people of Crimea
have a chance to start their own State if the Kosovars did?” Garton Ash
observes that “[i]t turns out that Vladimir Putin has more admirers around
the world than you might expect for someone using a neo-Soviet
combination of violence and the big lie to dismember a neighbouring
sovereign state.”165
At the very least, using legalistic rhetoric can muddy the waters, even
when the legal argument is doctrinally weak. As noted above, the use of
legal rhetoric can give policymakers in other States an excuse not to
become involved.
V. CONCLUSION
After all this talk of misuse of legal argument, obfuscation, frustration and
covert operations, is international law no more than an excuse, a cloak of
respectability covering up the ugly truths of power? Some say that all this
talk of laws and rights is worse than irrelevant: it obscures the real issues.
The American political scientist John Mearsheimer wrote:
One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it
wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from
joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its
foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right
when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as selfdetermination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into
brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military
165. Timothy Garton Ash, Putin has More Admirers than the West Might Think, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/17
/vladimir-putin-admirers-india-china-ukraine.
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alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States
certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about
Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these
facts of life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful
neighbor.166

It is important to be clearheaded about how States can project power
and the likely efficacy of legal arguments, as well as other strategies, in any
given situation. But this would mean considering that Russia may be
effectively using legal arguments to frame the issues, anticipating likely
responses, fostering support (or at least frustrate opposition), rallying its
domestic electorate and placing itself at the bargaining table. Russia uses
legal rhetoric as a component of its strategies in a variety of related games
such as the game to slow or prevent the expansion of Western institutions,
the game to maintain great power status in the former Soviet space, the
game to support Russian ethnic populations in its Near Abroad, the game
to build cooperative relations with China and the game to shore-up
domestic support in the midst of economic troubles.
To simply ignore legal argument is to cede a strategy, to concede
multiple positions.
If the EU and the United States do not want another South Ossetia or
Transnistria in eastern Ukraine, then they will have to actively engage
Russia’s arguments over what is “right.” Consider this statement by Putin
from late August 2014, explaining why the events in eastern Ukraine
confirm that Russia was correct in its actions in Crimea:
Now, I think, it is clear to everyone—when we look at the events in
Donbass, Lugansk and Odessa—it is now clear to everyone what would
have happened to Crimea, if we had not taken corresponding measures to
ensure that people could freely express their will. We did not annex it, we
did not seize it, we gave people the opportunity to express themselves
and make a decision and we treated that decision with respect.
I feel we protected them.167

166. John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Sept./Oct. 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/whyukraine-crisis-west-s-fault.
167. Putin, August Comments, supra note 83.
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Russia’s use of “law talk” is especially striking because it uses quasilegal rhetoric so often, even when it has rather weak arguments. While
Russia deploys legal language, increasingly they are not the concepts of
international law as generally accepted. Rather, Russia is building a
revisionist conception of international law to serve its foreign policy needs.
While the law of self-determination has evolved to foster rights and
political participation within multi-ethnic States, Russia (although also
supporting the idea of multi-ethnic States) has returned to the rhetoric of
ethnic identity and territorial irredentism. Because it is not the state of the
law, as a matter of strategy the West should not ignore Russia’s rhetoric.
The use of terms like “self-determination,” “right” and even
“international law” in speeches by presidents, foreign ministers and
diplomats may be shunted aside by some as “mere” political speech, much
as certain international relations theorists set aside mere “law talk.” But
both of these moves would be short-sighted. The pluralist nature of
international law means that in most cases there is no final interpreter of
what law is. Although the rhetoric of international law is not always in
synchrony with the current state of international law, it can still affect the
future shape of the law. More so than the ICJ, the most important
interpreters of international law are the States themselves. Their
interpretations are in part based on their short-term interests, but also on
their long-term concerns.
In the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Russia shifted
from emphasizing sovereignty and territorial integrity in relation to selfdetermination, to a rhetoric based on the will of the people in secessionist
enclaves. It was a rhetorical shift that may have been to support one or
more strategies. Russia’s rhetoric regarding its intervention in Georgia in
2008 in support of south Ossetia and Abkhazia could be interpreted as an
example of tit-for-tat gamesmanship, warning the United States to refrain
from further actions that Russia viewed as unilateral. It could also have
been a message to ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad, as well as the
governments of those countries. That message would have been that
Russian ethnics in these newly independent States have a right to selfdetermination—meaning, possibly, secession—if the government of those
States did not respond to their interests. And, moreover, Moscow had a
right to protect the interests of its co-ethnics. These arguments set off
hopes and aspirations in Russian ethnic enclaves in Transnistria and
elsewhere in the Near Abroad. The legal rhetoric over South Ossetia played
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a part not only in the game over Georgian territorial integrity, but it also
changed strategies in other games across the Near Abroad.
Then came Crimea. While Russia had made a shift in its argument
between Kosovo and South Ossetia, it attempted a different legal theory in
Crimea. Although Russia continued to note the importance of selfdetermination for the people of Crimea, it emphasized the importance of
righting the historical wrong of Crimea’s transfer by Nikita Khrushchev
from Russia to Ukraine. The arguments served multiple purposes. The selfdetermination issue played a part in muddying the waters and gave some
countries an excuse to just stay out of the whole situation. The avoidance
of the rhetoric of secessionism also responded to the concerns of China, a
country that Russia could not afford to offend. However, this emphasis of
historical rights also invigorated Russian enclaves in the Near Abroad in
the hopes that they might be the next Crimea.
In each of these instances, Russia’s rhetoric was framed by its strategic
interests, as well as by what could realistically be said within the framework
of international law. Its use of legal rhetoric, in turn, shaped the
expectations of States and their populations. Russia’s legalistic rhetoric
affected international relations.
International law has become a consensual vocabulary and grammar
for how States talk about international relations. How States talk about
terms like “self-determination” and “territorial integrity” can affect the
legal substance of what “self-determination” and “territorial integrity” are.
Legal rhetoric can frame policy options and policy outcomes.
But legal rhetoric can also destabilize international law. Even if Russia
does not take one more meter of another country’s territory, the effects of
its legal arguments can be serious.
The words and phrases of great powers resonate. At times, they
channel the evolution of international law. Others may adopt similar
modes of argumentation, similar interpretations, and similar practices.
Hopefully, Russia’s revisionist justifications concerning Crimea will not
have this effect.
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